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MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual; ) 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MC NICHOLS, 1 
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE ) 
DOES 1 -V, unknown individuals, 1 
1 
Defendants-Respondents. 1 
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' 
FIFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGMEN: 
RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket Nos. 361 30-2009 
(36 13 1-2009) 
Nez Perce County District Court Nos. 
2008-1 763 (2008- 1765) 
A FIFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with attachments was filed 
counsel for Respondents on March 5, 2010, requesting this Court for an order augmenting 
Record on Appeal with the file stamped copies of the documents attached to t h s  Mot 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
I 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' FIFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGME 
RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmenkation record shall include the docum, 
listed below, file stamped copies of whch accompanied this Motion: 
1. Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments with attachments, file stam 
February 16,201 0; 
2. Defendants' Joint Memorandum in Support of Motion for Amended Judgments, 
stamped February 16,2010; 
3. Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amen 
Judgment, file stamped February 16, 2010; 
4. Reed Taylor's Response to Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, 
stamped February 25,20 10; 
5. Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, file stam 
March 2, 2010; and 
6. Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants' Joint Mo 
for Amended Judgment, file stamped March 2,201 0. 
43 
DATED this 1\ day of March 2010. 
AUG;~~ILIA'~'ION RECOkU 
Val. A f 3 ~ t e K e n  W. Kenyon, ~ % r k  
cc: Counsel of Record 
In the Supreme Court o f  the State of Idaho 
I j I/ 
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A FIFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with attachments was filed by 
counsel for Respondents on March 5 ,  2010, requesting this Court for an order augmenting this 
Record on .Appeal with the file stamped copies of the documents attached to this Motion. 
Therefore. good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' FJFTH JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT 
RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents 
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this R4otion: 
1.  Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments with attachments, file stamped 
February 16, 201 0; 
2. Defendants' Joint Memorandum in Support of Motion for Amended Judgments, file 
stamped February 16.201 0; 
3. Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended 
Judgment, file stamped February 16. 2010; 
4. Reed Taylor's Response to Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, file 
stamped February 25,2010; 
5.  Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, file stamped 
March 2,20 10; and 
6. Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion 
for Amended Judgment, file stamped March 2,20 10. * 
DATED this 11 day of March 20 10. 
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2010 FEB 16 g 31 
James D. LaRue ISB #I780 
Jeffrey A. Thomson ISB #33801 
E L M  & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
CLERK OF THE DIST, COURT 
m@ESA DAMMo# 
DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
John J. Janis ISB #3599 
mPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY, CHTD. 
537 W. Bannock Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-75 10 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2927 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS, B R O W  & McNICHOLS, P.A., an 
Idaho professional corporation; JANE DOES 1 -V, 
unknown individuals, 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR 
AMENDED JUDGMENTS 
Reed J. Taylor, an individual; 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Case No. CV 08-0 1763 
PlaintifflAppellant, 1 Case No. CV 08-01 765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. COLLINS, a 
individual; RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership; JANE DOES 
I-X, unknown individuals; 
DefendantsIRespondents. I 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 1 
Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP by and through Jeffrey A. Thomson of Elam & Burke, 
P.A., and Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., by and through John 
J. Janis of Hepworth, Janis & Brody, P.A., (collectively refenred to as the "Defendant Attorneys") 
move the Court, pursuant to Rule 13(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure (giving the 
- A district courtjurisdiction to rule on any motion to amend the judgments during the pendency of 
an appeal) for amended judgments in the form attached hereto. 
This joint motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that: 
1. Two new Idaho Supreme Court cases have been issued during the pendency of the 
appeal in this matter that appear to make premature Plaintiffs appeals fkom this Court's 
Opinions and Orders on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend 
Complaint and from the Judgments previously entered in these two actions (consolidated for 
purposes of appeal); 
2.  Any further delay in the appeals in these matters is not in the interest of any party 
to these appeals, nor is it in the interest of judicial economy; and 
3. This joint motion is made to avoid a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court that 
Plaintiffs appeals were premature thereby r e q u i ~ g  a remand in order to allow this court to 
amend the judgments in the same manner as requested by this joint motion. 
The Defendant Attorneys request that this court enter amended judgments in the form 
attached so that these amended judgments can be supplemented into the consolidated appellate 
record and thereby perfect appellate jurisdiction over Plaintiffs appeals. 
This joint motion is based upon the records, files, and pleadings in the above entitled 
actions, together with a supporting memorandum and affidavit of counsel filed herewith. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 2 
DATED this /[ day of February, 20 10. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
orneys for Gary D. Babbitt, D. John 
a h b y ,  Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley, 
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
DATED this / O  %a y of February, 20 1 0. 
FEPWORTH JANIS & BRODY, CHTD. 
By: 
/$%n J. ~ d d o f  the firm 
E. McNichols and 
& McNichols, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the // day of February, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond - J U.S. Mail 
Michael S. Bissell - Hand Delivery 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC Federal Express 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16 7 Facsimile Transmission 
Spokane, Washington 9920 1 (509) 455-71 11 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR A 
James D. LaRue ISB ##I780 
Jeffrey A. Thomson ISB #3380 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
E & B File No. 7082-0013 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Plaintiff, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & H A W E Y  LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, unknow 
individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-0 1765 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint came on for 
hearing before this Court on December 4,2008 and Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys' 
Fees came on for hearing on February 26,2009. James D. LaRue of the firm Elam & Burke 
P.A., appeared for Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 1 
Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis 62 Hawley LLP. Michael S. Bissell of the law firm Campbell, 
Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, appeared for Plaintiff. This Court having reviewed the record in this 
matter, together with motions, memoranda, briefs and affidavits filed concerning the above 
referenced motions, as well as oral argument presented by counsel, and the Court having issued 
its Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, it is 
hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED and Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint in its entirety 
The Court also having issued its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 3, 2009, and having considered all factors in I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3) and 58(a), and in the exercise of the discretion of this Court found an award of 
attorneys' fees as set forth below appropriate. 
Accordingly, JUDGMENT has been entered, under the standards of Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54 and Idaho Code Sections 12-12 1,30-1-746(2) and (3), 48-608(5), in favor of 
Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, against the Plaintiff in the amount of $20,058.00. This portion of 
the Judgment ("the Money Judgment") has been satisfied. 
DATED this - day of February, 20 10. 
JEFF M. BRUDIE 
District Judge 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of February, 201 0 , I  caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Roderick 6.  Bond U.S. Mail 
Michael S. Bissell Hand Delivery 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC Federal Express 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 Facsimile Transmission 
Spokane, WA 9920 1 
James D. LaRue 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 





John J. Janis U.S. Mail 
HEPWORTH JANIS & BRODY, CHTD. Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2582 Federal Express 
Boise, ID 83701 Facsimile Transmission 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
By : 
Deputy Clerk 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3 
John J. Janis ISB itf3599 
EIEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY, CHTD. 
537 W. Bannock Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-75 10 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2927 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ; PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS, B R O W  & McNICHOLS, P.A., 
an Idaho professional corporation; JANE DOES 
I-V, unknown individuals, 
Defendants. I 
Case No. CV 08-0 1763 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint came on for 
hearing before this Court on December 4,2008 and Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys' 
Fees came on for hearing on February 26,2009. John J. Janis of the firm Hepworth, Janis & 
Brody, Chtd., appeared for Defendants Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown & 
McNichols, P.A. Michael S. Bissell of the law firm Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, appeared 
for Plaintiff. This Court having reviewed the record in this matter, together with motions, 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 1 
memoranda, briefs and affidavits filed concerning the above referenced motions, as well as oral 
argument presented by counsel, and the Court having issued its Opinion and Order on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, it is hereby ORDERED that 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is 
GRANTED. 
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint in its entirety. 
The Court also having issued its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 3,2009, and having considered all factors in I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3) and 58(a), and in the exercise of the discretion of this Court found an award of 
attorneys' fees as set forth below appropriate. 
Accordingly, JUDGMENT has been entered, under the standards of Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54 and Idaho Code Sections 12- 12 1,30- 1 -746(2) and (3), 48-608(5), in favor of 
Defendants Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., against the 
Plaintiff in the amount of $20,058.00. This portion of the Judgment ("the Money Judgment") has 
been satisfied. 
DATED this day of February, 20 10. 
JEFF M. BRUDIE 
District Judge 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of February, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following; in the 
manner indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond - U.S. Mail 
Michael S. Bissell - Hand Delivery 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC - Federal Express 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 - Facsimile Transmission 
Spokane, WA 9920 1 
James D. LaRwe 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
- U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
- Federal Express 
- Facsimile Transmission 
John J. Janis - U.S. Mail 
HEPWORTH JANIS & BRODY, CHTD. - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2582 - Federal Express 
Boise, ID 83701 - Facsimile Transmission 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3 

J a m s  D. LaRue ISB #I780 
Jeffrey A. Thornson ISB #33801 
ELAM & B u m ,  P.A. 
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
John J. Janis ISB #3599 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY, CHTD. 
537 W. B a o c k  Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-75 10 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2927 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
PlaintifflAppellant, 
v. 
Reed J. Taylor, an individual; 
PlaintifflAppellant, 
v. 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS, B R O W  & McNICHOLS, P.A., an 
Idaho professional corporation; JANE DOES I-V, 
unknown individuals, 
DefendantslRespondents. 
Case No. CV 08-0 1765 
Case No. CV 08-01763 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. COLLINS, an 
individual; RICHARD A. W E Y ,  an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership; JANE DOES 
I-X, unknown individuals; 
Defendants/Respondents. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS - 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the pendency of the consolidated appeal in these matters and prior to oral 
argument (currently scheduled for April 9,2010)' the Idaho Supreme Court issued Spokane 
Structures, Ine. v. Equitable Investment, LLC, 2009 Opinion No. 6, filed January 28, 2010, and 
Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty 's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 20 10 Opinion No. 15, filed February 3, 
2010. These two cases attempt to clarify, for court and counsel, the proper procedure for 
obtaining, and the proper form, of an appealable final judgment. 
In Spokane Structures, the Court determined that the original notice of appeal, appealing 
from an order granting summary judgment, was premature because the order was not a final 
judgment. But for a supplementation of the appellate record with a proper final judgment, the 
appeal would have been remanded. 
In Goodman Oil the Court determined that an earlier document was the final appealable 
judgment and since Goodman Oil's appeal was not filed within forty-two (42) days of that 
judgment the appeal was untimely. This led to its dismissal. This motion does not contend that 
PlaintiWAppellant Taylor's appeals are untimely, just premature. However, premature appeals 
do not right jurisdiction over appeals. Consequently, in order to keep the appeal on track, the 
premature nature of these appeals need to be cured. 
In the appeal from these matters, the PlaintiWAppellant Taylor filed Notices of Appeal 
from this court's Opinions and Orders on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend Complaint filed on December 23,2008. The Notices of Appeal were filed within 
forty-two (42) days of these Opinions and Orders but, pursuant to the analysis in Spokane 
Structures and Goodman Oil, these Opinions and Orders do not qualify as final appealable 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS - 2 
judgments. Neither Opinion and Order is a "separate document" stating only the relief granted or 
denied. Both also contain this court's legal reasoning and analysis. Indeed, the relief granted in 
the Opinions and Orders were denials of the Motions to Amend Complaint and grants of the 
Motions to Dismiss, but neither order actually dismissed the Complaints. 
There were Judgments entered subsequent to the Opinions and Orders, but they were 
entered only after an award of attorney fees and were solely money judgments. Plaintiff;/ 
Appellant also filed Amended Notices of Appeal to include appeals from these judgments. 
Under Spokane Structures, this would normally have cured the prematurity of the Plaintiff's 
original Notices of Appeal and perfected jurisdiction. However, because neither Judgment, on its 
face, states the relief granted or denied with respect to the Motions to Amend the Complaint or 
the Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, the appeals from these judgments are premature.' 
Pursuant to these two new cases, it appears that the Opinions and Orders and the 
Judgments do not meet the Idaho Supreme Court's "clarified" final appealable judgment 
analysis. Unless jurisdiction is perfected the likely result is a remand to this Court to enter the 
very amended judgments sought by this joint motion. Since this will lead to another round of 
appeals and unwanted delay, Defendant Attorneys are taking the laboring oar to perfect the 
appeals by seeking these amended judgments which will then be made a part of the appellate 
record, thereby giving the Idaho Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal.2 
'Both judgments are money judgments for awards of attorney fees. Neither judgment 
addresses the dismissal of the complaints. 
*'While it may seem unusual that Defendant Attorneys are trying to perfect Plaintiffs 
appeals, the Defendant Attorneys believe that it is in no party's best interest to m h e r  delay a 
decision on the merits. Moreover, it would be an extreme waste ofjudicial resources and of the 
parties' time and money to go through the ministerial process of amending the judgment after it 
has been remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court only to then be appealed again. Counsel for 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS - 3 
Under Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(4) this court has the power and authority to rule upon 
"any motion to amend the judgment". I.A.R. 13(b)(4). See also Ward v. Ltcpitlacci, I 1 1 Idaho 
40,720 P.2d 223, (Ct.App. 1986) (District Court has power to enter judgment while case is on 
Defendant Attorneys sought assistance from Plaintiff and his counsel to perfect Plaintiffs 
appeals by stipulation but were refused. See Affidavit of Counsel, 7 4. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS - 4 
4. On June 4,2009 Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Notice of Appeal adding and 
appealing &om the Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and 
Costs, Judgment entered on April 24,2009, and Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Attorney Fees) entered on June 
1,2009. 
5. On February 18,2008 this appeal was consolidated with PlaintiFs appeal in the 
McNichols case. 
6. On August 26,2009 a Satisfaction of Judgment was entered satisfjmg the money 
judgment in the amount of $20,058.00 as fully paid, satisfied and discharged. 
B. Clements, Brown & McNichols Defendants. 
1. On December 23,2008, this Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. It contains the court's legal reasoning and 
analysis and orders the following relief (1) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is hereby 
DENJED; and (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. 
2. On January 30,2009 Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal appealing from this 
Opinion and Order. Plaintiff does so claiming that it is a "final Order". 
3. On April 24,2009 a Judgment was entered on behalf of the Clements Brown and 
McNichols Defendants. The Judgment refers only to the Opinion and Order on Defendant's 
Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, dated April 3,2009, and enters a money judgment 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS - 5 
in the amount of $20,058.00.3 The Judgment does not refer to nor mention the previous Opinion 
and Order nor does it order the dismissal of the Complaint. 
4. On June 4,2009 Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Notice of Appeal adding and 
appealing from the Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and 
Costs, Judgment entered on April 24,2009, and Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Attorney Fees) entered on June 
1, 2009. 
5. On February 18,2008 this appeal was consolidated with Plaintiff's appeal in the 
HTEH case. 
6. On September 3,2009 a Satisfaction of Judgment was entered satisfymg the 
money judgment in the amount of $20,058.00 as fully paid, satisfied and discharged. 
111. ANALYSIS 
This joint motion seeking amended judgments is brought at this time because of two 
recent cases issued by the Idaho Supreme Court relating to that Court's subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment, LLC, 2009 
Opinion No. 6, filed January 28,2010, and Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, 
Inc., 2010 Opinion No. 15, filed February 3,2010.~ These new cases stand for the proposition 
that the Plaintiffs original appeals from the two Opinions and Orders on Defendants' Motion to 
3Although the judgment states "TWENTY THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT AND ZERO 
CENTS" the parenthetical number has a typographical error. It states "$28,058.00" but should 
also read $20,058.00. 
4'While the time for reconsideration andlor rehearing has not yet passed on these two 
cases, the pending oral arguments on Plaintiffs appeals are scheduled for April 9,2010 and 
require immediate action in order to avoid sua sponte remands due to premature appeals. 
DEFENDANTSy JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS - 6 
Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motions to Amend Complaint were premature and the subsequently filed 
judgments were not final appealable judments and therefore did not cure the premature nature of 
the original appeals. Because the Plaintiffs appeals are premature, the Idaho Supreme Court 
does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeals and will likely remand the cases for entry of proper 
final judgments. The joint motion seeks to avoid a remand which would lead to lengthy delays 
before the merits of the appeals can be heard. By supplementing the appellate record with 
amended judgments that meet the Idaho Supreme Court's new "clarified" standards and 
perfecting plaintiffs appeals any W e r  delays can be avoided. 
A. The Opinions and Orders on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiff's 
Motions to Amend Complaint are Not Final Appealable Judgments. 
In order to clarify what a final judgment is, the Court in Spokane Structures stated the 
following: 
As a general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment that 
ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, 
and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties. It 
must be a separate document that on its face states the relief 
granted or denied. 
Id. at p. 6, citing Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 867,55 P.3d 304, 321 (2002). 
Rule 58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[elvery judgment shall be 
set forth on a separate document." See I.R.C.P. 58(a). 
The purpose of this rule is to eliminate confusion about when the 
clock for an appeal begins to run. The separate document 
requirement was also designed to eliminate uncertainty over what 
actions of the district court are intended to be its judgment. 
Spokane Structures at p. 5. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS - 7 
The "separate document" requirement was discussed in Spokane Structures as follows: "For 
example, a document entitled 'Order' that stated 'it is hereby ordered that the complaint is 
dismissed' would constitute a judgment. It would set forth the relief to which the party was 
entitled." Id. at p. 6. However, "merely typing 'It is so ordered' at the end of the memorandum 
decision does not constitute a judgment." Id. "The judgment must be a separate document that 
does not contain the trial court's legal reasoning or analysis." Id. The judgment that the district 
court is to sign must be a document that is separate from the jury's verdict or the court's decision. 
Id. 
In the case at bar, the Orders and Opinions do not meeting the "separate document" test 
and are therefore not final appealable orders or judgments. First, they are not a "separate 
document" containing only the relief granted. They also contain this Court's legal reasoning and 
analysis. Second, the Opinions and Orders do not, on their face, state the final relief granted. 
Instead they state as follows: 
ORDER 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is hereby DENJED. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. 
Opinion and Order, p. 16. Neither, as required by Spokane Structures, set forth the ultimate 
relief from which the appeals have been taken, specifically that the complaints have been 
dismissed. The Opinions and Orders are not final appealable judgments according to Spokane 
Structures and the original appeals were premature. 
B. The Jud~ments are Not Final Appealable Judgments as to the Dismissal of the 
Complaints. 
The Judgments entered by this Court in these two cases are money judgments entitling the 
Defendants to attorney fees and costs. Neither Judgment dismisses the relevant complaint. 
DEFENDANTSy JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS - 8 
Although the Judgments qualify as a "'separate document" as defined by Spohne Structures, 
neither provide the relief to which the parties are ultimately entitled and from which the appeals 
were taken (i.e., dismissal of the Complaints). See Spokane Structures, p. 5. Neither judgment 
states on its face the relief granted except as to attorney fees.' The judgments, therefore, are not 
final appealable judgments on the substantive issue appealed &om. 
C. Plaintiff's Appeals are Premature; A Simply Cure is Available. 
Because there are no final appealable judgments in these two cases, Plaintiffs Notices of 
Appeal were premature. Spokane Structures at p. 7. "Numerous civil cases in Idaho hold that a 
premature notice of appeal is ineffective to vest jurisdiction on appeal." Id. citing Dept. of 
Health and Welfare v. Doe, 147 Idaho 357,358-59,209 P.3d 654,655-56 (2009). Therefore, 
currently the Idaho Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs appeals. 
However, Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(2) provides: 
A notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment, order or 
decree before formal written entry of such document shall become 
valid upon the filing and the placing [ofl the stamp of the clerk of 
the court on such appealable judgment, order or decree, without 
refiling the notice of appeal. 
I.A.R. 17(e)(2). Therefore, there is a simple cure to Plaintiff's premature appeals. That cure is to 
enter amended judgments and then submit the amended judgments to the appellate court. In 
order to avoid fiuther delay in these already lengthy proceedings, the most efficient method for 
'While the appeals from the award of attorney fees and costs may have been perfected by 
these subsequent Judgments, it is highly unlikely that the appellate court would retain jurisdiction 
to decide these issues while at the same time dismissing the appeal as premature on the 
substantive issues. To hold otherwise would mean that the Idaho Supreme Court would decide 
entitlement to attorney fees and costs without deciding which parties ultimately prevailed. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS - 9 
keeping the substantive issues before the appellate court is to enter amended judgments and 
allow the parties to supplement the appellate record before the oral arguments on April 9,20 10. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Defendants respecthlly request that this Court enter the Amended Judgments in the 
form attached to the joint motion. 
DATED this // day of February, 20 10. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
meys for Gary D. Babbitt, D. John 
shby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley, v 
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
of February, 201 0. 
HEPWORTH JANIS & BRODY, CHTD. 
By: 
Michael E. McNichols and 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
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Michael S. Bissell - Wand Delivery 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC - Federal Express 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 - / Facsimile Transmission 
Spokane, Washington 9920 1 (509) 455-71 1 1  
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Jeffrey A. Thomson, having first been duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am a shareholder in the law firm of E l m  & Burke, P.A., at all relevant times 
counsel of record for Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP and having reviewed the contents of the file in this matter, 
make this affidavit based on personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Spokane Structures, Inc. 
v. Equitable Investment, LLC, 2009 [sic] Opinion No. 6, filed January 28,20 10. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Goodman Oil Co. v. 
Scotty 's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 20 10 Opinion No. 165, filed February 3,20 10. 
4. I contacted Plaintiffs counsel and asked whether the Plaintiff would be willing to 
stipulate to Amended Judgments in order to perfect his appeals, but the declined to do so. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this // day of February, 20 10. 
before me this 1 1  dayofFebruary,2010. 
n 
Notary Public for Idaho + . 
~ e s i d i n ~  at: wd 1 ,A.,Ldhm 
My Commission Expires: 0 11 10120 12 
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Michael S. Bissell Hand Delivery 
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IN THE SUPmME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Doeket No. 35349-2008 
SPOKANE STRUCTUmS, INC., a 1 
Washington Corporation, 1 Boise, November 2009 Term 
1 
Plaintfff-Appellant, 1 2009 Opinion No. 6 
1 
v. 1 Filed: January 28,2010 
1 
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, LLC, an 1 ~teghen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
Idaho Lidted Liability Company, a k a  1 
SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES, 1 
1 
Defendant-Rapondent. ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Kootenai County. The Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge. 
The judgment of the district court is vacated. 
Wetzel, ~ e t z e l ,  Gredeson & Holt, P.L.L.C., Coeur d'Alene, for appellant. Steven 
C. Wetzel argued. 
Paine Hamblen LLP, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Patrick E. Miller argued. 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
This is an action to recover damages for preparing plans and specifications for a building 
remodel. The parties had entered into a "DesignJBuild Agreement," but after the plaintiff 
prepared the plans for the remodel, the defendant elected not to proceed with the project. The 
district court granted summary judgment holding that the parties had an express contract that did 
not obligate the defendant to pay any money if it elected not to proceed with the project and that 
recovery under any equitable theory was precluded because of the existence of the express 
contract. Because the parties did not have a binding contract, we vacate the summary judgment 
and remand for further proceedings. 
EXHIBIT A 
1. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Equitable Investment, LLC, (Landowner) approached Spokane Structures, Inc., (Builder) 
about desiping the remodel of a building into a commercial office and warehouse and then 
providing the labor and materials for the remodel. The parties executed a one-page document 
entitled "DesigdBuild Agreement," which provided as follows: 
This agreement between SPOKANE STRUCTURES, INC. and 
Systemstechnologies [sic] sets forth the scope of the work to be performed by 
SPOKANE STRUCTURES, INC. in the design and construction of an office and 
warehouse of approximately 7950 sq. ft. located in Hayden, Idaho. Spokane 
Structures, h c .  agrees to design, engineer, and draft plans in preparation of all 
documentsldrawings required to enable the owner and contractor to agree on a 
final design and cost of construction to be performed. As a minimum the 
drawings to be prepared should include: 
1. Site and location plans to determine building location and elevation, set 
backs from property lines and utility locations. 
2. Building foundations, slabs and sidewalks. 
3. Building floor plans. 
4. Schedules of doors, windows, finishes, etc. 
5. Exterior building elevation to show style, forin and finish. 
. 6. Building sections to show sufficient detail required to achieve style and 
to show code compliance. 
7. Electrical system layout. 
8. Heating, air conditioning and ventilation to show all equipment and 
ducting. 
9. Plumbing system layout including location of all special requirements, 
hose bibs, etc. 
A final cost for construction will be provided upon completion of the plans and 
approval from the City of Hayden Building Department. The cost for 
construction is not to exceed $605,000.00, which includes all costs associated 
with construction, including overhead and profit. Change orders will be handle 
[sic] in writing only, and billed at cost of change plus 20% for profit and 
overhead. Billing for construction will be monthly progress billing on the 
percentage of completion method. This agreement is contingent upon the owners 
getting fmancing. Should financing not be obtained Spokane Structures, Inc. will 
be paid $5000.00 for the plans. A $2,500.00 retainer is required at signing of this 
agreement. 
Builder commenced working on plans for the remodel, and Landowner requested various 
changes including increasing the building size by 5,000 square feet. On March 16, 2007, Builder 
completed a final design incorporating those requested changes. It sent Landowner the remodel 
plans along with a proposed construction contract signed by Builder under which it agreed to 
complete the project for $644,092. Landowner decided not to follow through with the project. 
On June 7,2007, Builder filed a complaint alleging that the DesignlBuild Agreement was 
a binding contract and seeking either specific performance of the agreement or damages for 
breach of conbact, unjust enrichent, quantum meruit, or promissory estoppel. Landowner filed 
an answer, and on February 12, 2008, it moved for summary judgment. At the hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment, the district court orally ruled that the DesignlBuild Agreement 
was an unambiwous, express contract; that Landowner could not have breached the contract 
because its t e r n  did not obligate Landowner to do anything; and that Builder could not recover 
on any equitable theories because there was an express contract. 
On April 15, 2008, the district court entered an order granting Landowner's motion for 
summary judgment. On June 17,2008, aRer briefing and argument, the court entered an order 
awarding Landowner court costs, including a reasonable attorney fee, in the sum of $14,446.75. 
On May 23, 2008, Builder had filed a notice of appeal. The district court did not enter a 
final judgment until June 24, 2008, and then on July 15, 2008, it entered an amended judgment 
which included the award of costs. 
11. ANALYSIS 
A. Do We Have Jurfsdiction To Hear this Appeal? 
Before we address the merits of the appeal, we will consider the effect of Builder's 
premature notice of appeal. Insofar as is relevant to this case, an appeal as a matter of right 
could only be taken h m  a judgment, order, or decree that was fmal. I.A.R. 1 l(a)(l). In this 
case, Builder filed its notice of appeal before entry of the final judgment, and it stated in the 
notice of appeal that it was appealing "from the Order granting summary judgment entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 15th day of April, 2008." In addition, the clerk's record on appeal 
was prepared and filed with this Court before the final judgment was entered, and therefore the 
final judgment was not in the record on appeal. ARer this Court raised the lack of a fmal 
judgment during oral argument, Landowner supplemented the record with copies of the final 
judgment and the amended judgment. 
At the time Builder filed its notice of appeal, the district court had entered its order 
granting summary judgment. That order stated: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there 
exists no issue as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Plaintiff be, and it is, granted and that judgment will 
be entered in favor of the Defendant Equitable Investment, LLC, and against the 
Plaintiff, Spokane Structures, Inc. 
This order did not constitute a judgment. As we stated in In re Universe Life Insurance 
Co., 144 Idaho 75 1,756, 171 P.3d 242,247 (2007), "An order granting summary judgment does 
not constitute a judgment." 
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides with respect to a motion for 
summary judgment: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.) 
The "judgment sought" is not an order granting a motion for summary judgment. The judgment 
sought is a final determination of a claim or claims for relief in the lawsuit. This Rule must be 
read in context with Rules 54(c) and %(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule S4(c) states that "every frnal judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled."' (Emphasis added.) The relief to which a party is entitled 
is not the granting of a motion for summary judgment. The Rule refers to the relief to which the 
party is ultimately entitled in the lawsuit, or with respect to a claim in the l a ~ s u i t . ~  The granting 
of the motion for summary judgment is simply a procedural step towards the party obtaining that 
relief. 
The "relief to which the party . . . is entitled" must be read in connection with other rules. 
Rule 8(a)(l) provides, "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief. . . shall contain . . . (2) a 
I 
Rule 54(c) states in full: 
A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed 
for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by 
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. - 
If there is more than one claim in a lawsuit, a judgment on one claim would not be a final judgment unless it was 
certified as final under Rule 54(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or judgment had already been entered on 
the other claim@). 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled."The "demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled" obviously refers to the relief that the 
party seeks in the lawsuit. For example, neither the Builder in its complaint nor the Landowner 
in its answer prayed for the granting of a motion for summary judgment. In this case, the relief 
sought by Builder was either specific performance of the DesigdBuild Agreement or damages, 
and the relief sought by Landowner was dismissal of Builder's complaint. The relief to which a 
party is entitled is the specific redress or remedy that the court determines the party should 
receive in the litigation, or with respect to a claim for relief in the litigation. 
Rule 58(a) requires that "[elvery judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." 
That requirement was added to the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1992. Hunting v. Clark County 
School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634,637,93 1 P.2d 628,63 1 (1997). "The purpose of this rule is 
to eliminate confbsion about when the clock for an appeal begins to m. The separate document 
requirement was also designed to eliminate uncertainty over what actions of the district court are 
intended to be its judgment."46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 8 70 (2006) (footnotes omitted). Thus, 
in Hunting, 129 Idaho at 637, 931 P.2d at 631, we held that an "'Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment,' stating that "pllaintiffs complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice"' was not a judgment that started the running of the time for appeal because it was not 
a separate document. 
Unfortunately, this Court has at times contributed to the confbsion by focusing upon 
whether the document "adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a frnal 
determination of the rights of the parties," Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,641,991 P.2d 362, 
366 (1999), without also requiring that it be "a separate document" that "grant[s'J the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled," I.R.C.P. Rules 58(a) & 54(c). Thus, in 
Davis v. Peacock we held that there was a final judgment even though "it does not appear that 
the district court ever expressly dismissed or ruled on Peacock's counterclaim." 133 Idaho at 
640, 991 P.2d at 365. Similarly, in Scaggs v. Mutual of Enurnclaw Insurance Co., 141 Idaho 
114, 117, 106 P.3d 440, 443 (2005), we held that a "Decision and Order" was a final judgment 
even though the order was not a separate document. At the end of the five-page written decision, 
the district court had merely typed, "It is so ordered." 
In order to clarify what a final judgment is, we restate: "As a general rule, a final 
judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the 
controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties. It must be a 
separate document that on its face states the relief granted or denied." Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., 137 Idaho 850, 867, 55 P.3d 304, 321 (2002) (citations omitted). Although it would be 
better practice to entitle the document "Judgment"in order to avoid any confbsion, the title is not 
determinative. "Whether an instrument is an appealable order or judgment must be determined 
by its content and substance, and not by its title." Id. For example, a document entitled "Order'" 
that stated "It is hereby ordered that the complaint is dismissed" would constitute a judgment. It 
would set forth the relief to which the party was entitled. 
Obviously, however, merely typing "It is so ordered'" at the end of a memorandum 
decision does not constitute a judgment. The judgment must be a separate document that does 
not contain the trial court's legal reasoning or analysis. Rule 58(a)(l) provides that a trial court 
'"hall sign the judgment" "upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by the court that a 
party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied." Likewise, Rule 
58(a)(2) states that the trial court "shall approve the form and sign the judgment" "upon a 
decision by the court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict 
accompanied by answers to interr~~atories."~ Obviously, the judgment that the court is to sign 
must be a document that is separate from the jury's verdict or the court's decision. Similarly, 
Rule 54(d)(S) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shows that the jury verdict or a decision of 
the court is not the same as a judgment. That Rule provides: 
' Rule %(a) provides: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): (1) upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a 
decision by the court that a party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be 
denied, the court shall sign the judgment and the judgment shall be entered by the judge or clerk; 
(2) upon a decision by the court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict 
accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the court shall approve the form and sign the 
judgment, and the judgment shall be entered by the judge or the clerk. Every judgment shall be 
set forth on a separate document. The filing of a judgment by the court as provided in Rule 5(e) or 
the placing of the clerk's filing stamp on the judgment constitutes the e n 6  of the judgment; and 
the judgment is not effective before such entry. The entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for 
the taxing of costs. The entry of judgment shall not be made in a divorce or annulment action 
unless and until the prevailing party fwllishes to the clerk a completed certificate of divorce or 
annulment on a form fwllished by the department of vital statistics.. In addition, entry ofjudgment 
shall not be made as to any decree that contains the obligation for one party to pay child support 
unless and until it is accompanied by the completed transmittal form to the Department of Health 
and Welfare. 
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party 
who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs, 
itemizing each claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be filed 
later than fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment. 
Because the memorandum of costs is to be filed ''after . . . a decision of the court" but not later 
than "fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment," the "decision of the court" resolving the 
lawsuit and the "judgment" must be two different documents, 
In this case, the district court signed an order granting summary judgment and an order 
awarding court costs, but it did not then sign a separate document that would constitute a 
judgment until one month afler Builder had filed its notice of appeal. Thus, Builder's notice of 
appeal was premature. "Numerous civil cases in Idaho hold that a premature notice of appeal is 
ineffective to vest jurisdiction on appeal." Department of Health & Werfare v. Doe, 147 Idaho 
357, 358-59, 209 P.3d 654, 655-56 (2009). However, Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(2) provides, 
"A notice of appeal filed fkom an appealable judgment, order or decree before formal written 
entry of such document shall become valid upon the filing and the placing the stamp of the clerk 
of the court on such appealable judgment, order or decree, without refiling the notice of appeal." 
Since the district court's grant of Landowner's motion for summary judgment resolved all of the 
substantive issues in this case, we hold that Builder's premature notice of appeal became valid 
upon the entry of the frnal judgment on June 24, 2008. We therefore have jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal. See Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian Athletic Ass 'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 
51 1,670 P.2d 1294, 1296 (1983). 
B. Did the District Court Err in Dismissing the Complaint? 
The district court held that the Desigm'Build Agreement was an express contract; that 
Landowner did not breach the contract because it did not obligate Landowner to do anything; 
and that the express contract barred Builder's equitable claims. The district court erred in 
holding that the Desigm'Build Agreement was a contract. 
During oral argument on appeal, both parties admitted that the DesignlBuild Agreement 
was not a binding contract because it was merely an agreement to agree. "It is essential to an 
enforceable contract that it be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and requirements so 
that it can be determined what acts are to be performed and when performance is complete." 
Dale's Service Co., Inc. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 664, 534 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975). Under the 
DesignfBuild Agreement, the parties left for future agreement both the plans and specifications 
describing the scope of the work to be done and the contract price, which were essential, 
interrelated terms. "No enforceable contract comes into being when parties leave a material term 
for future negotiations, creating a mere agreement to agree." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 
141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974,984 (2005) (quoting from 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 8 181 
(2004)). Therefore, we vacate the judgment, the award of costs and attorney fees, and the order 
granting summary judgment. 
C. Is Builder Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to Idaho 
Code 12-120(3)? 
Builder seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 8 12-120(3). 
That statute provides for the awarding of a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in 
various types of civil actions. Because we do not yet know who will prevail in this action, any 
detemination of the prevailing party is premature. City of McCaZI v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 
667, 201 P.3d 629, 640 (2009). If the district court on remand determines that Builder is the 
prevailing party in this action, it may award Builder attorney fees for this appeal. Lexington 
Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276,287,92 P.3d 526,537 (2004). 
111. CONCLUSION 
We vacate the judgments of the district court, the order awarding costs and attorney fees, 
and the order granting summary judgment. We remand this case for further proceedings that are 
consistent with this opinion. We award appellant costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal. 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
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W. .JONES, Justice 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 2, 1995, one of the Respondents, Bart McKnight, on behalf of Scotty's Duro- 
Built Generator, Inc., entered into a Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement (Vacation 
Agreement) with Appellant, Goodman Oil Company, and two other parties. In the Vacation 
Agreement, tlie parties consented to the vacation of a portion of First Avenue South by the City 
of Nampa, Idaho. The Vacation Agreement also stipulated "[tlhat the parties shall klly 
cooperate to ensure that the purpose and intent of this Agreement shall be accomplished.'" 
On July 28, 2004, Goodman Oil entered into a contract with James Wylie whereby 
Goodman Oil agreed to sell its property to Wylie for $600,000, However, the sale was 
contingent upon the vacation of First Avenue South in a manner that was satisfactory to both 
Goodman Oil and Wylie. Wylie submitted development plans for Goodman Oil's property, and 
on Aupst  4, 2004, the Nampa Fire Department gave their written approval. The Fire 
1 
EXHIBIT B 
Depament approved the vacation of First Avenue South subject to the dedication of a twenty- 
foot wide fire apparatus access road easement and conditioned upon Wylie obtaining consent 
fram adjoining property owners. 
On August 16, 2004, Ordinance No. 3374 (the Ordinance) watt approved by the Nnmpa 
City Council and by the Mayor, which was necessary for the vacation of First Avenue South to 
occur. Respondent Bart McKnight spoke with the Mayor and voiced his objection to the 
vacation, and the Mayor, after. approving the Odinance, later vetoed the Ordinance. 
Consequently, the Ordinance was not published and did not become law, and as a result, the 
vacation failed. 
Goodman Oil argues that because the vacation did not occur, Goodman Oil's land sale to 
Wylie failed. Goodman Oil subsequently filed a complaint against Duro-Bilt; Bart McKnight, 
the owner of Duro-Bilt; and Alane McKnight, Bart's wife, collectively referred to in this Opinion 
as Duro-Bilt, aserting four claims in its complaint: count I, breach of contract; count 11, tortious 
interference with a purchase and sale agreement; count 111, negligent interference with 
prospective economic advantage; and count IV, intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage. The breach of contract claim was for the alleged breach of the Vacation 
Agreement, and the tort claims were for the alleged interference with the land sale contract 
between Goodman Oil and Wylie, 
Dmro-Bilt filed a motion for summary judgment on June 29, 2006, and the district comt, 
on September 19, 2006, entered an order dismissing Bart and Alane NcKnight, in their 
individual capacities, from the case. Goodman Oil filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
order; however, Goodman Oil's motion for reconsideration was denied on November 7,2006. In 
addition, on the same day, the district court entered an order dismissing count 11, totious 
interference with a puxcllase and sale agreement; count 111, negligent interference with 
prospective economic advantage; and count IV, intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage. Duro-BiIt subsequently filed a second motion for summary judgment, 
and on February 6,2007, the district court granted summary judgment dismissing count I, breach 
of contract. Goodman Oil filed a motion for reconsideration, and on April 2, 2007, the district 
court denied Goodman Oil's motion. In addition, that same day, the district court awarded Duro- 
Bilt and Bart and Alane McKnight attorney fees and costs under I.C. fj 12-121, and the district 
court, on Aug~~st 7,2007, entered an order which set the amount of attorney fees and costs owed, 
On October 16, 2007, Goodman Oil moved the district court to enter a final judgment. 
The district court denied Goodman Oil's motion, and Goodman Oil filed a notice of appeal on 
November 23,2007 , 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether Goodman Oil's notice of appeal was timely. 
11. Whether the district court erred when disn~issing Bart and Alane McKnight from the 
case. 
111. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on all counts. 
N Whether the district court ened in awarding attorney fees and costs to Duro-Bilt and Bart 
and Alane Mcf i igh t  
V. Whether this Court should award attorney fees and costs to either Goodman Oil or Duro- 
BiIt on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court exercises free review over questions of subject-matter jurisdiction. Slate v. 
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,483,80 P.3d 1083,1084 (2003)- 
DISCUSSION 
I. This Court llolds that Goodman Oil's notice of appeal was untimely. 
On February 2, 2007, as stated above, the district court executed an order granting 
summary judgment for Duro-Bilt on Goodman Oil's last remaining claim, breach of contmct. 
Goodman Oil filed a motion for reconsideration on Febmary 2.3, 2007, and the district court 
entered an order denying Goodman Oil's motion on April 2,2007. Goodman Oil and Duro-Bilt 
dispute whether, under I.A.R. 14(a), the allotted forty-two days for Goodman Oil to file a notice 
of appeal began to mn on April 2,2007, the date the final order not concerning attorney fees 
were entered. Under 1.A.R 14(a), a notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two days of a 
district court's judgment that is appealable as a matter of right. 
Goodman Oil claims that the district court's April 2,2007, order did not trigger the forty- 
two day time limit because it was not a judgment and it was not set forth in a separate document. 
In forming its argument, Goodman Oil relies upon I.R.C.P. 58(a), which states: "Every judgment 
shall be set forth on a separate document." Goodman Oil also cites the Supreme Court Rules 
Committee's explanation for the separate document requirement, which states that a separate 
document is needed in order to eliminate confirsion and so that all parties know when the time 
for appeal has begun. In addition, Goodman Oil argues that 1.R.C.P. %(a) has been interpreted 
in Htrrrtiirg v. Clark Cotritty Scltool Dist., 129 Idaho 6.34, 931 P.2d 628 (1997), Cnnrp v. East 
3 
Fork Ditch Co,, Ltd , 137 Idaho 850, 55 P-3d 304 (2002), and bt re U~tiverse L@ Itis. Co., 144 
Ida110 571, 171 P.3d 242 (2007), wherein this Court found that an order granting summary 
judgment was insufficient to constitute a final judgment under I.R.C.P. 58(a) because it was not 
entitled "judgment" and had not been entered in a separate document 
Duto-Bilt argues that the appeal is barred because Goodman Oil did not file a notice of 
appeal within forty-two days of April 2, 2007, the date the district court: disposed with the last 
issue not concerning attorney fees. Duro-Bilt claims that the requirement that "[elvery judgment 
shall be set forth in a separate documen4" as stated in I.R.C.P. 58(a), was satisfied on April 2, 
2007. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a), Duro-Bilt argues, states that a "'lj]udgment' as used 
in these rules includes a decree and any order &om which an appeal lies." In addition, Duro-Bilt 
claims tllat I.A.R. 11 (a)(l) states that an appeal as a matter of right may be taken from a final 
judpent, order, or decree. This Court, Durn-Bilt argues, llas also held that "a final judgment is 
an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and 
represents a final determination of tlte rights of the parties." C4tq7, 137 Idaho at 867,55 P.3d at 
321 Duro-Bilt argues that the order issued April 2, 200'7, denying Goodman Oil's motion for 
reconsideration, meets the definition of "final judgmenti' because no other issues were left to be 
decided. Duro-Bilt argues, thus, because the order amounted to a final judgment, Goodman Oil 
could have appealed as a matter of right, and because the order was appealable, the order 
amounted to a "judgment," as defined under I.R.C.P. 54(a). Because the order was a 
"judgment,"under the definition of 'tjudgment" in 1.A-R. 14(a), Goodman Oil was required to 
file a notice of appeal within forty-two days of the date the order was entered. In addition, Duro- 
Bilt argues that the April 2, 2007, order satisfied the "separate document" requirement, as 
required under I.R.C.P. 58(a), because the order was a separate document. 
This Court recognizes that there has been some confusion as to when the forty-two day 
time limit is triggered under l.A R. 14(a), and in 1992, it tried to eliminate confusion by adding 
an additional sentence to I.R.C.P, 58(a), which deals with the method of an entry of judgment. 
The amendment states: "Every judgment sl~all be set forth on a separate document." Id 
However, this Court is aware that I.R.C.P. %(a) says nothing about the time to appeal and that 
there is still confusion as to when the forty-two day time limit begins to run. This Court takes 
this opportunity to hopefully bring an end to the confusion. 
This Court l~olds that the forty-two day period to file a notice of appeal begins to run 
once an order is entered that resolves all issues, grants all relief to which the prevailing party is 
entitled other than attorney fees and costs, and brings an end to a lawsuit. It does not matter 
whether the order is entitled, judpent, order, or declee. Consequently, Gooding Oil's notice of 
appeal was untimely because the district court entered an order on April 2,2007, disposing with 
the last non-attorney fee issue in the case, and Goodman Oil did not file a notice of appeal until 
November 23,2007, more than six months after the order was entered. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within forty-two days 
of "any jtldgtaetrt, or& or decree of the district court [that is] appealable as a matter of right in 
any civil . . . action." (emphasis added). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) shtes what 
constitutes an entry of a judgment: "[Ulpon a decision by the court granting other relief . . the 
C O U ~  shall approve the form and sign the judgment, and the judgment shalI be entered by the 
judge or the clerk* Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." 
Application of a tl~ree-step process leads to the conclusion that an order that grants all 
relief requested other than costs and attorney fees constitutes a "judgment" under 1.R.C-P. 58(a); 
and as a result, the order triggers the forty-two day time limit under I.A.R. 14(a). First, I.R.C.P. 
54(a) states, "'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies." Second, 1.A.R I l(a)(l) states when an appeal lies; I.A.R. 1 l(a)(l) states that an 
appeal as a matter of right may be taken fram judgments, orders, and decrees which are final, 
Lastly, this Court has defined what constitutes a final order or judgment- This Court has held 
that "[als a general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, 
adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the 
rights of the parties." Canp, 137 Idaho at 867,55 P 3d at 321. Therefote, because an order that 
brings an end to a lawsuit other than issues of costs and attorney fees constitutes a final 
judgment, id ,  and an appeal as a matter of light may be taken fiom a final judgment, 1.A.R 
1 l(a)(l), an order that brings an end to a lawsuit constitutes a "judgment." I R.C.P. 54(a). 
This holding is in line with recent decisions by this Court. In Sltelto~i v. Sl~elioa, No, 
35854-2008, 2009 WL. 4093724, at 3 (Idaho Nov. 27, 2009), this Court held that an order 
granting a motion to dismiss was a final order, and accordingly, the time to appeal began to run 
when the order was entered. Likewise, this Court in B K  /)rientzort)~tai)r Hospital, hc., Y, Ada 
Cotlnry, 35904, 2009 WL 4263558, at 1 (Idaho Dec. 1, 2009), held that a magistrate's order 
constituted a final judgment, and consequently, because a notice of appeal was not filed within 
the requisite number of days from the order; this Court held that the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. In addition, the foregoing application of I.A.R. 14 and 
1,R.C.P. 58(a) promotes the best interest of the parties, as it promotes finality and closure in the 
litigation process. 
Goodman Oil also argues that 1,R.C.P. 58(a) requires a judgment to be entered on a 
separate document. n t i s  Court finds that the order entered by the district cot~rt on April 2,2007, 
has satisfied the requirement, as the order was a separate document and was a judgment under 
the definition of I.R,C,P. 54(a). Since this Court found Gooding Oil's appeal to be untimely, the 
temaining issues need not be considered on appeal. 
11. This Court awards attorney fees and costs to Duro-Bilt and Bart and Alane 
Memight on appeal. 
This Court @ants Duro-Bilt's request for costs and attorney fees under I.C. (i 12-120(3). 
Attorney fees are to be awarded under LC. 5 12-120(3) to the prevailing party in an action 
arising out of a commercial transaction. In this case, the Vacation Agreement was integral to 
Goodman Oil's lawsuit against Duro-Bilt; without the Agreement, the lawsuit would not have 
been brought.. Brotver v. 8.1 DtiPotrt De Ne~~rotirs mtti Co , 11 7 Idaho 780, 784,792 P.2d 345, 
349 (1990) (stating that attorney fees are appropriate under I.C. (i 12-120(3) when the 
commercial transaction is integral to the claim.) The Agreement's central nature to the claim is 
also apparent by the fact that the same action by Duro-Bilt brought about both the tort and breach 
of contract claims. Each arose out of Duro-Bilt's objection to the vacation of First Avenue 
South. Accordingly, costs and attorney fees are to be awarded to Duro-Bilt, the prevailing party. 
Goodman Oil argues that it is entitled to attorney fees under LC. 12-120(3) if it prevails 
on appeal. Since Goodman Oil has not prevailed, no fees are awarded, 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that Goodman Oil's notice of appeal was 
untimely. This Court awards attorney fees to Duro-Bilt and Bart and Alane McKnight on appeal. 
The temaining issues need not be considered on appeal. Costs are awarded to Durn-Bilt and Bart 
and Alane McKnight. 
.Justices BURDICK, HORTON and Justices pro teltt TROUT and IUDWEL.L CONCUR. 
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RESPON$E TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Reed J. Taylor, by and through attorneys, Michael S. Bissell and 
Roderick C. Bond of Campbell, Bisscll & Kirby, PLLC, submits this Response to Defendants' 
Joint Motion for Amended Judgment: 
I. INTKODIJCTION 
Despite requests from the undersigned counsel, the defendants' counsel will not explain 
why "Amended Judgments" are required in the form and manner submitted, except to "ripen" the 
appeal. Of course. when clear questions are not answered by the defendants' counsel, it becomes 
obvious why Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to their proposed "Amended Judgments." 
Curiously, the defendants argue on one hand that there are no final judgments. Yet, on the other 
hand, the defendants submitted proposed "Amended Judgments" for the court to sign and 
included other substantial language that is not in accord with the I d d ~ o  Rules of Civil Procedure. 
11. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
A. The "Amended Judpments" are not required as the court's orders were 
appealable orders. 
An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted and denying a motion to amend are an appealable orders. See Goodmun 
Oil Cornpcmy v. Scolly '.T Dzrro-Rilt Generuror. Inc., 20 10 WI, 366704 *3-4 (Idaho 20 10); 
I.K.C.P. 54(a); 1.K.C.I'. %(a); I.A.K. I l(a)(l). 
On Dccembcr 23, 2008, the court entered its opinion and orders granting the defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss and denying Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. Although Recd Taylor 
contends that the court did not address a number of his arguments and claims, the opinions and 
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orders were appealable orders. and Reed Taylor timely appealed those orders. 
R .  r i s sumin~  Defendants' ar~uinents are correct, their proposed "Amended 
.Judgmentsv are not appropriate and violate the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1 .  Even if the defendants are correct, no judgments may be amended nfter 14 
days from entry. 
A motion to alter or arncnd a judgment must be braught within 14 days of the date of any 
.judgment. I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
Defendants content that there are no final jud~ments and curiously submit, without 
explanation, proposed "Amended Judgments." If, as the defendants contend, a fornlal judgment 
is necessary and that a judgment was never entered, then there would be no "Amended 
Judgments" as there were never any judgments to begin with. As for including the attorneys' 
fees and costs judgments within their "Proposed Amended Judgments," the time has long passed 
to amend those judgments, assuming they are not void under the defendants' arguments. 
Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, then only a judgment may be cntcred, not 
an amended judgment and not addressing issues of fees arid costs or the satisfaction of any 
.judgments, piuticularly when those judgments would be void under the defendants' rationale. 
2. Even if the defendants are correct, the judgments must be a separnte 
document. 
"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." I.R.C.P. %(a). "A 
judgment slzall not contain a recital of pleadings. . ." I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
Thus, it would be wholly inappropriate to include any language regarding the pleadings, 
affidavits or other information considered. particularly when certain pleadings and affidavits 
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referenced in the proposed "Atncnded Judgments" were never submitted or relied up011 the court 
to render its decision on the Motions to Ilismiss and Motions to Amend. 
'T'hus, if the dcfcndants' arguments are correct, ally judgment should be a separate 
document, should not recite pleadings, should conform to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and should not be based upon the language in the proposed Amendcd Judgments, 
3. Even if the defendants are correct, language should be included in the 
.Judgment stating that they do nut include claims or causes of action which 
accrued after October 15,2008. 
Reed Taylor filed his Motions to Amend and Supplement Complaints on October 15, 
2008. If  the court enters any new, revised or amended judgments or orders, thcn the court should 
insert language in the judgments or orders stating that they do not bar claims or causes of action 
which accrued after October 15, 2008. 
4. Even if the defendants are correct and the court enters new, revised or 
amended judgments, the award of attorneys' fees was premature as there 
w i ~ s  no final judgment under the defendants' theory. 
If the defendants' theory is correct, then the award of any attorneys' fees and costs would 
have been premature as there was no final judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(U). Without a final 
judgment, there can be no prevailing party under Rule 54 and il I'ollows that the judgments 
entered awarding attorneys' fees and costs are void. I.K.C.1'. 60(b)(4). 
Therefore. Reed I'aylor requests that the court order the defendants to pay the $20,058 
previously tendered to them by Reed Taylor to avoid execution into the clerk of the court 
purs~rant to I.C. Cj 10-1 115. If so ordered, Reed 'I'aylor would stipulate that a new judgment 
could be entered on the award of attorneys' fees and costs so long as the judgment is worded 
identical to the prior judgments and is based upon the identical reasons without the necessity of 
requiting the court to hold new hearings on the issue of fees and costs. If the defendants refuse 
to pay the $20,058 (a total of $40,116) the court clerk, then Reed Taylor requests that the court 
order the defendants to entcrjudgment in favor of Reed Taylor for thc $40,116 owed to him. 
5. If the defendants are correct, then a satisfaction of judgment cannot be 
entered by the court and must be a separate document. 
A satisfaction of a judgment may only be entered by a party, the party's attorney or the 
court clerk. I.R.C.P. 58(b); I.C. fi 10-1 115. A judgment must be on a separate document. 
I.R.C.P. 58(a). 
'l'hus, even if the defendants' arguments are correct, a satisfaction of judgment may not 
be entered by the court and should not be included in any judgment or order. Rather. any 
satisfaction of judgment should only be entered by the in accordance with I.C. 5 10-1 115. 
I-lowever, if the defendants do not agree to promptly pay the $20,058 to the court clerk, then no 
satisfaction of judgment should be entered by the court clerk and the court should enter a 
judgment in favor of Reed Taylor in the amount of $20,058 for each action. 
6. If  the defendants are correct, the language in the judgments should stated 
that his "Complaints" were dismissed and not his "Amended Complaints" as 
asserted in the proposed Amended Judgments. 
111 their proposed "Amended Judgments," the defendants asserted Ianguage stating that 
"JUD(;MENPI' is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in its entirety." 
See Proposed Amended Judgments, p. 2 (underlined emphasis added). if the defendants' 
arguments are correct, then the judgments or orders entered by the court should only reference 
KI~SI'ONSl~ '1'0 DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 5 
-- 
"Complaints" and not "Amended Complaints" as Reed Taylor's Amended Complaints were 
never filed.' 
7. The defendants fail to address the above issues and fail to submit any 
explanation why their proposed "Amended Judgments" are titled as such 
and contains other questionable and/or inappropriate language. 
The defendants never answered questions several issues and questions posed by Reed 
Taylor's counsel in their Joint Motions or othenvise. Why are the defendants proposing 
"Amended Judgments" instead of "Judgments"? Why are the defendants including the 
attorneys' fees judgments in the "Amended .ludgmentsm? Why are the defendants including 
satisfaction ofjudgments in the "Amended Judgments"? Why have the defendants' worded their 
proposed Amended Judgments in the manner worded in light of the arguments asserted above 
and the Rules of Civil Procedure addressed above? Why did the defendants not limit the 
language in their proposed "Amended Judgments" to only claims and causes of action which had 
accrued through October 23, 2008? 
It is not surprising thal Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to the proposed 
"Amended Judgments" in light of the issues presented above and above unanswered questions. 
DATED this 25th day February, 2010. 
MTCIIAEI, S. BISSELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
' Counsel for the defcnda~its have acknowlcdged that "Amended" Complaints should not be included in 
their proposed "Amended Judgments." However, this argument is being asserted to prcservc thc objection. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
I IiEI.tEJ3Y GER'TTPV that on the 25" hay of February, 20 10. I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of tllc foregoing, postage prepaid (if applicable), to the following parties: 
IIAND DELIVERY .John J .  .ranis 
- iJ.S. MAIL I fcpworth, Janis & Brody, Chtd. 
ClVI<KNIGH1' MAIL P.O. Box 2582 
FAX 7'KAN SMIS SION Boise, ID 83701 -2582 
EMAIT, (.ptif al-lachmcnt) 





&EMAIL (.pdC attachment) 
J m e s  D. 1.aRue 
Jeffrey A. 'Thornson 
E l m  & Burke, PA 
iZ.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83704 
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RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOTN7' MOTION FOR AMENDED SUTIGMENTS - 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Reed J. Taylor, by and through his attorneys, Michael S. Bissell and 
Roderick C. Bond of Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PT,I.C, submits this Response to Defendants' 
Joint Motion for Amended Judgment: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite requests from the undersigned counsel, the defendants' counsel will not explain 
why "Amended Judgments" are required in the form and manner submitted, except to "ripen" the 
appeal. Of course, when clear questions are not answered by the defendants' counsel, it becomcs 
obvious why Reed 7'aylor would not agree to stipulate Lo their proposed "Amended Judgments." 
Curiously, the defcnd'mts argue on one hand that there are no final judgments. Yet, on the other 
hand, the defendants submitted proposed "Amended Judgments" for the court to sign and 
included othcr substantial language that is not in accord with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
11. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
A, The "Amended Judvrnents" are not requircd as the court's orders were 
appealable orders. 
An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted and denying a motion to amcnd are an appealable orders. See Goodman 
Oil C,'ompany v. Scoffy 's Durn-Bill C;enernfor, Inc., 201 0 WL 366704 *3-4 (Idaho 201 0); 
I.R.C.P. 54(a); I.R.C.P. 58(a); I.A.R. I l(a)(l). 
On December 23, 2008, the court entcred its opinion and orders granting the defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss and denying Rced 'l'aylor's Motions to Amend. Although Reed Taylor 
contends that the court did not address a number of his arguments and claims, the opinions m d  
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orders wcrc appealable orders, m d  Reed 'T'aylor timely appealcd those orders. 
B. Assuming Defendants' arpun~ents are correct, their proposed "Amended 
Judgments" are not appropriate and violate the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1 .  Even if the defendants are correct, no judgments may be amended after 14 
days from entry. 
A motion to alter or m e n d  a judgment must be brought within 14 days of thc date of ally 
judgment. I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
llefendants content that there are no final judgments and curiously submit, without 
explanation, proposed "Amended Judgments." If, as the defendants contend, a formal judgment 
is necessary and that a judgment was never entered, then there would be no "Amended 
Judgments" as there wcrc never any judglnents to begin with. As for including the attorneys' 
fees and costs judgments within thcir "Proposed Amended Judgments," the time has long passed 
to amend those judgments, assuming they are not void under the defendants' arguments. 
Thus, if the dcfcndants' zgumcnts are correct, then only a judgment may be entered, not 
a.11 amended judgment and not adbessing issucs of fees and costs or the satisfaction of any 
.judgments, particularly when those judgments would be void under the dcfcndants' rationale. 
2. Even if the defendants are correct, the judgments must be a separate 
document, 
"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." I.R.C.P. 58(a). "A 
judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings. . ." I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
Thus, it would be wholly inapproprii~te to include any language regarding the pleadings, 
affidavits or other information considercd, particularly when certain pleadings and affidavits 
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referenced in the proposed "Amended Judgments" were never submitted or relied upon the court 
to render its decision on the Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Amend. 
Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, any judgment should be a separate 
documcnl, should not recite pleadings, should conform to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and strnuld not be based upon the language in the proposed Anlcnded Judgments. 
3. Even if the defendants arc correct, language should be included in the 
Judgment stating that they do not include claims or causes of nction which 
accrued after October 15,2008. 
Reed 'I'aylor filed his Motions to Amend and Supplenient Complaints on October 15, 
2008. If the court enters any new, reviscd or amended judgments or orders, then the court should 
insert language in the judgments or orders stating that they do not bar claims or causes of action 
which accrued after October 15, 2008. 
4. Even if the defendants are correct and the court enters new, revised or 
amended judgments, the award of attorneys' fees was premature as there 
wns no final judgment under the defendants' theory. 
If the defendants' theory is correct, then the award of any attorneys' fees and costs would 
have been premature as there was no final judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(I)(B). Witllout a Gnal 
judgment, there can be no prevailing party under Rule 54 and it follows that the judgments 
cntercd awarding attorneys' fees arid costs are void. J.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). 
l'herefore, Reed Taylor requests that the court order the defendants to pay the $20,058 
previously tendered to them by Reed 'I'aylor to avoid execution into the clerk of the court 
pursuant to 1.C. t j  10- 1 1 15. If so ordered, Reed Taylor would stipulate that a new judgment 
could be entered 011 the award of' attorneys' lkes and costs so long as the judgment is worded 
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identical to the prior judgments and is based upon the identical reasons without the necessity of 
requiring the court to hold new Ilearings on the issue of fees and costs. If the defendants refuse 
to pay the $20,058 (a total of $40,1 16) the court clerk, then Reed Taylor requests that the court 
order the dei'endants to enter judgment in favor of Reed Taylor for the $40,116 owed to him, 
5. If the defendants are correct, then a satisfaction of judgment cannot be 
entercd by the court and must be a separate document, 
it satisfaction of a judgment may only be entercd by a party, the party's attorney or the 
court clerk. I.R.C.P. 58(b); 1.C. 10-1 115. A judgmcnt must be on a separate document. 
I.R.C.P. %(a). 
Thus, even if the defendants' arguments are correct, a satisfaction of judgrncnt may not 
be entered by the court and should not be included in any judgment or order. Rather, m y  
satisfaction of judgment should only be entered by the in accordance with I.C. $ 10-1 115. 
IIowever, if the defendants do not agree to promptly pay the $20,058 to the court clerk, then no 
satisfaction of judgment shc)uld be entered by the court clerk and the court should entcr a 
,judgment in favor of Reed Taylor in the m o u n t  of $20,058 for each action. 
6. If the defendants are correct, the language in the judgments should stated 
that his "Complaints" were dismissed and not his "Amendcd Complaints" as 
asserted in the proposed Amended Judgments. 
In their proposed "Amended Judgments," the defendants asserted language stating that 
"JiJl>(jMF.NT is hereby entered DTSMISSTNG Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in its cntircty." 
See Proposcd Amended Judgments, p. 2 (underlined emphasis added). If the defendants' 
arguments are correct, then the judgnlcnts or orders entercd by the court should only rcl'ercnce 
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"Complaints" arid not "Amended Complaints" as Reed 'I'aylor's Atncnded Complaints were 
ncvcr filed.' 
7. The defendants fail to address the above issucv and fail to submit any 
explanation why thcir proposed "Amended Judgments" are titled as such 
and contains other questionable and/or inappropriate Innguage. 
The defendants never answered qucstions several issues and questions posed by Reed 
Taylor's counscl in their Joint Motions or otherwise. Why arc the defenda1.1ts proposing 
"Amended Judgments" instead of "Judgments"'? Why are the defendants including the 
attorneys' fecs judgments in the "Amended Judgments"? Why are the dcfcndants including 
satisfaction ofjudgments in thc "Amended Judgments"? Why have the defendants' worded their 
proposed Amended Judgments in the manner worded in light of the arguments asserted above 
and the Rulcs of Civil Procedure addressed above'? Why did the defendants not limit the 
language in their proposed "Amendcd Judgments" to only claims and causes of action which hnti 
accrued through Octobcr 23,2008? 
It is not surprising that Reed Taylor would not agrec to stipulate to the proposed 
"Amended Judgments" in light of thc issues prescnted above and above unanswered qucstions. 
DATTID this 25th day February, 20 10. 
CAMPBELL. B I S S ~ I ,  & KIRBY, PLLC 
RODE RICK^ BOND 
MICIIAEL , l31SSEI,T, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
' Counsel for the defendants have acknowledged that "Amended" Complaints should not be included in 
their proposed "Amended Judgtnents." However, this sirgunlent is being asserted to preservc the objection. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F  THE 
STATE O F  IDAHO, IN AND F( 
Reed J. Taylor, an individual; 
MICHAEL E. McNICI-IOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A., an 
ldaho professional corporation; JANE DOES I -V, 
unknown individuals, 
. THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
Case No. CV 08-0 1763 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED 
JUDGMENTS 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I Case N o  CV 08-01 765 
v. 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASI-IBY, an individual; PA'I'RICK V. COLLINS, an 
individual; IIICtlARD A. RILXY, an individual; 
I IAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & t IAWLEY LLP, 
an ldaho limited liability partnership; JANE DOES 
I-X, unknown it~dividuals; 
De fendants/Responden ts. 1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff/Appellant Reed J. 'Taylor ("'Taylor") has refi~sed to stipulate and now has 
opposed Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments even though the purpose of the 
motion is to ripen Taylor's premature appeals. Instead, Taylor is attempting to negotiate a better 
position than the one he had when he appealed this Court's decision. First, he asks this Court to 
insert language that makes the Amended Judgments retroactive to a date long before the current 
Judgments were entered and even before this Court entered its Opinions and Orders upon which 
the Judgments are based. Second, he seeks to undo the current Judgments awarding attorney fees 
and the satisfactions of those Judgments. The attorney fee issues are on appeal and cannot be 
undone by a request for a final, appealable judgment, especially when made by the prevailing 
parties in order to perfect the losing party's appeals. The Amended Judgments will have 
whatever effect they will have and Taylor can make his arguments of their affect to the Supreme 
Court. 
This Court has jurisdiction to amend the Judgments. The Amended Judgments are 
needed to ripen Taylor's appeals. The DefendantsIRespondents' interest in doing so is to have 
the merits of the appeals heard at the currently scheduled oral argument (April 9 ,20  10) and to 
avoid the delay that will be caused if the Amended Judgments are not entered before then. 
Taylor's attempt to either cause delay or to leverage a better position for himself through what 
should be a simple, ministerial act should not be countenanced and the joint motion should be 
granted. 
11. ANtlLYSIS 
?'lie "legal" groi~nds argued by 'Taylor to prcvcnt the Amended Jucfgments from being 
entered are without merit. Taylor fails to distinguish, analyze, discuss or even mention, let alone 
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cite to, the new Supreme Coi~rt case that created the prcmati~rity of his appeals in the first place 
and was the genesis of DefendantsiRespondcnts' quest to cure that prematurity. (kSee E x .  A 
attached to 'rhomson Afkidavit in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgment, 
Spokane Sirtrct~r~es, Inc. v. Eqtritcrhle fnvestlnent, LLC, 2009 Opinion No. 6 (January 28, 20 1 O).) 
Nor do the conglomeration of the rules and statutes cited by 'Taylor prevent the entry of the 
Amended Judgments. DefendantsiRespondents will address each of Taylor's arguments in the 
order made. 
A. The Court's Oninions and Orders Were Not Annealable; the Amended Jud~ments  
Will Be Final and Annealable. 
Taylor claims that the Opinions and Orders granting the Motions to Dismiss the 
Complaints and denying the Motions to Amend are final, appealable orders. As soon as 
DefendantslRespondents learned of the Spokane Structures case they forwarded a copy of that 
case to Taylor's counsel, analyzed how the case affected his appeals and requested that he 
stipulate to amended judgments. (See Ex. A to Supplemental Thomson Affidavit, emaif dated 
February 1, 20 10.) The bases of Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments, to which 
Taylor objects, was Spokane Strtictures. Any reasonable interpretation of Spokune Strzlctures is 
that this Court's Orders and Opinions granting the Motions to Dismiss and denying the Motions 
to Amend are not final, atmealable orders and that the later filed Judgments are final only as to 
attorney fees and not to the substantive issues on appeal. Despite being presented with Spokcrne 
Strtlcitves on two separate occasions, 'faylor fails to mention or cite to this case. 
Instead, he cites to Goo~ltntrn Oil Co. v. Scoffy 's Duro-Bilt Genertrtor, Inc., 20 10 Opinion 
No. 15,20 I0 WL 366704 (February 3, 20 10) fbr the proposition that an order granting a motion 
to dis~niss and denying a motion to amend are appealrible orders. While the Goodtucin Oil case is 
not a lexicon of clarity, i t  in no manner can be read to make the Orders and Opinions in this case 
tinal, appealable orders. First, Cioo~/tncm Oil deals with an i ~ n t i m e l ~  appeal, whereas the issue 
here is the prematurity of the appeals as is ciiscussed in Spukcine ,Sfr.rrcttlt.r.r, making ,Spok~tr?e 
,Sfrzlctrve.s the pertinent case. Second, Goot/mnn Oil does not overrule or undo (and in fact 
supports) the Spokcme Stt.trctlrres requirement that a judgment be a separate document from 
Orders and Opinions not containing the Court's reasoning and basis for granting the relief upon 
which a judgment would be entered. Third, without describing the order upon which appellate 
jurisdiction was based, the Goocirncm Oil Court held that i t  was a separate document and was a 
judgment under the definition of  Rule 54(a) and was therefore appealable. Obviously, i t  did not 
contain the district court's reasoning, a defect the Opinions and Orders clearly have. Fourth, no 
where in Goodmctn Oil does the Court analyze or even mention orders denying motions to 
amend. Under either Spokane Strtlct~tres or Goodman Oil, the Orders and Opinions in this case 
do not meet the proper requirements and are therefore not appealable. Under the most recent, 
applicable case law rendered by the Idaho Supreme Court, Taylors' appeals are premature. 
Based on that same case law the method for curing that prematurity is to enter Amended 
Judgments. 
B. The Amended Judpments Do Not Violate the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1. Rule 59(e) Requiring Amendments to Jud~ments  After Fourteen (1 4) Days 
From Entrv Does Not Annly. 
First, the DefendantsIRespondents have never taken the position that a judgment was 
never entered. As Taylor well knows, Judgments were entered on April 24, 2009, thus the need 
for Amended Judgments. DefendantsIRespondents' argument is instead that there was no final, 
uppealrtble ji~dgment as to the substantive issues on appeal and that this Court has j~~risdiction to
enter the same. (Set. Idaho Appellate Rules 13(b)(4) and 13.) 
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Second, 'Taylor's semantics rtside, if the Court deems it appropriate to call the proposed 
documents Judgments rather than Amended Judgments, the Defendants/Rcspondcnts have no 
objection. 'There are, howevcr, final, appealable Judgments regarding attorney fees and costs and 
another documented "Ji~dgment" could lead to confusion. Regardless, any new Judgments or 
Amended Judgments would not effect those awards. Under this new Judgment scenario, Rule 
59(e) would not apply. 
Third, Rule 59(e) does not apply to these Amended Judgments. To the extent any rule 
basis is needed (other than the appellate rules already cited to the Court), a motion to amend the 
judgments can be made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) or (6). There is no time limit for bringing a 
60(b)(5) or (6 )  motion other than i t  be within a reasonable time. Compron v. G'ompton, 10 1 Idaho 
328,6 12 P.2d 1 175 (1 980). See also Low v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259,646 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App. 
1982). Bringing a motion within days of a new Supreme Court case is clearly within a 
reasonable time. Moreover, while a lawsuit is on appeal a district court has jurisdiction to act in 
aid of and not inconsistent with the appeal. Coerrr dillene T ~ i ~ C l u b  v. Cogswell, 93 Idaho 324, 
46 P.2d 107 (1969). Entering Amended Judgments would certainly aid these appeals by giving 
the appellate court jurisdiction. Indeed, Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(4) grants this court the 
power to rule upon "any motion to amend the judgment". I.A.R. 13(b)(5). Idaho Appellate Rule 
13(b)(13) grants this court jurisdiction to take any action or enter any order required for the 
enforcement of any judgment, order or decree. The Idaho Court of Appeals has defined the 
power of the district court to correct 3 judgnient so that i t  accurately reflects the action taken by 
the Court. CVc~rtl v. Ltlpinncci, 1 1 1 Idaho 40, 720 P.2d 223 (Ct.App. 1986). Clearly, the 
Amended Ji~dg~nents are an attempt to correct the prior Judgments to acci~rately retlect the lion- 
appealable Orders and Opinions of this court. 
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Undcr Taylor's theory that Rule S")(e precludes a Motion to Amend the Judgment as 
untimely, Rule 13(b)(5) and (13) would be rendered supertluous. Indeed, the logical extension of 
Taylor's argument is that there is no cure to solve the lack of jilrisdiction for his appeals. 
2 The Pronosed Amended Judements itre Segurate Documents as Required by 
the Rules and the Newest Cuse Law. 
Taylor argues that the Amended Judgments "contain a recital of pleadings" and therefore 
violate of Rule 54(a) and do not meet the requirement of a separate document under Rule 58(a). 
Taylor's argument is based on the following language in the proposed Amended Judgments: 
"This Court having reviewed the record in this matter, together with motions, memoranda, briefs 
and affidavits filed concerning the above referenced motions, . . . i t  is hereby ORDERED that 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is 
GRANTED." 
There is no recital of any document in the proposed Amended Judgments. A recital 
contemplates a reiteration of the contents of the document rather than a listing of the type of 
document. More importantly, Rule 7(a) limits "pleadings" to complaints, answers, replies to a 
counterclaim, answers to a crossclaim, and third party complaints and states that no other 
pleading shall be allowed. I.R.C.P. Rule 7(a). There are no mentions, let alone recitals, of any 
"pleadings" in the language above. Consequently, the original Judgments regarding attorney fees 
do not violate Rule 54(a) and the Amended Judgments are in proper form. 
The language attacked by Taylor is form language and may not be required. On the other 
hand, its presence does not violate the separate document rule or the final judgment rule. 
Nevertheless, if i t  is of concern to the Court, Defendants/Respondents have no objection to 
removing it. 
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3. There is No Basis to Include Lan~uaye  in the Amended Jud~ments  About 
Their Legal Effects. 
Taylor has demanded, as a condition to stipulating to the proposed iltnended Judgments, 
and now asks the Court, to insert language that the Judgments and Orders and Opinions do not 
bar claims or causes of action which accrued after October 15, 2008. (Supplemental Thomson 
Aff., Ex. B, p. 4.)' There are no legal grounds to require language that describe the legal effect of 
the Amended Judgments. The Amended Judgments will be effective as of the date they are 
entered. Whether these Judgments are still premature, in the proper form or how they may effect 
other claims or causes of action, will occur or not occur as a matter of law and will be decided on 
appeal. This Court does not need to list each and every effect the Amended Judgments may have 
upon entry. Moreover, the dates selected by Taylor (October 15 andlor 23, 2008) predate this 
Court's Opinions and Orders (filed December 23, 2008) granting the Motions to Dismiss and 
denying the Motion to Amend. Under no circumstances can any Judgment have any effect prior 
to the court's decision upon which the Judgment is based. 
Finally, Taylor's efforts to negotiate a better deal than this Court granted him by seeking 
to predate the Judgments before the Court's decisions is frivolous and acts merely to delay this 
litigation and the appeals. No such language should be added to either proposed Amended 
Judgment. 
4. The Award of Attorney Fees was Not Premature Under Anv Theory. 
Citing to Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and claiming there must be a finnl Judgment before there can 
be an award of attorney fees and costs, Taylor claims that the awards were premature because 
'Taylor also uses the date "October 23, 2008". DcfendantslRespondents are at a loss as to 
the significance of either date. 
IXEI'1,Y IN SUPPORT OF DE1:ENIIAN'I-S' JOINT 
MO'1710N 1:OR I~ILIENDED JUDGblENTS - 7 
there were no tinal judgments. Rule 54(d)(l)(U) allows the trial court to determine who tvas a 
prevailing party by considering the tinal judgment "'or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties." 'The very rule used by Taylor does not require a final judgment 
before there is an award of attorney fees. Therefore, the award is neither premature nor void. 
Other rules are in concurrence. (See 54(d)(I)(F) (execution refers only to a judgment, not a final, 
appealable judgment); Rule 58(d) (satisfaction of judgments refers only to judgments, not final, 
appealable judgments); Rule 62(a) (execution may issue immediately upon an entry of judgment, 
not a final, appealable judgment and in fact discusses interlocutory judgments).) indeed, Rule 
54(d)(5) allows a party to submit a Memorandum of Costs "at any time after the verdict of a jury 
or a decision of the court." (See Rule 54(d)(5).) It also places a deadline of fourteen (14) days 
after entry of judgment, not h a 1  judgment, for filing the Memorandum of Costs. If the 
Memorandum of Costs is not filed within that period there is a waiver of the right to costs. Id. 
Since there were Judgments (regardless of whether they were final judgments) the Defendants 
would have waived their rights to costs and fees if they had not requested them within fourteen 
(14) days of that judgment. Taylor's theory of prematurity of attorney fees runs head-on into the 
rule's waiver provision. 
Nevertheless, Taylor requires as a precondition to a stipulation, a court order that the 
Defendants pay back to Taylor the amount he voluntarily paid for the awards of attorney fees. As 
will be seen bclow, Taylor is attempting to undo history and to negotiate a better deal than that 
which existed when hc appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Regardless, a motion sought to 
ripen '17aylor's appeals is not the propcr stage upon which 'faylor should be seeking to undo this 
court's award of attorney fees. Those issues are on appeal and inserting language that resolves 
I<Iil'L,Y IN SUI'I'ORT O F  DEFENDr\NFSS' JOINT 
I\/lO'I'ION I'OK ,ZhlENflt311 JUI)GhlEN'SS - 8 
those issues is beyond this Court's jurisdiction. 'I'lrere shoi~ld be no order or language in the 
Amended Judgments requiring a repayment of attorney fees. 
5.  'l'he I\mentlcti Jutlr~mcnts 1)o Not Effcct the S;ltisfilctions of ,lutlr~mcnt. 
Taylor seems to argue that a satisfaction of a judgment must also meet the separate 
document requirement of Rule 58(a). It does, but regardless the separate document rule does not 
apply to a satisfaction. 
More incredibly, Taylor asks this Court, as a condition to entering Amended Judgments, 
to undo the Satisfactions of Judgment and enter judgments in favor of Taylor in the amount of 
the attorney fee awards. Though he does not say so, this unusual request that he be declared the 
prevailing party and that the DefendantsIRespondents pay to him the attorney fee awards made to 
them, appears to be based on the argument above - that the awards of attorney fees were 
premature. For the same reasons as discussed above, the proposed Amended Judgments or any 
separate order should not reverse the Satisfactions of Judgment or the awards of attorney fees. 
6. The Latest Proposed Amended Judgments Do Refer to "Complaints" Rather 
Than "Amended Complaints". 
Despite curing this problem before Taylor filed his objection to the Joint Motion for 
Amended Judgments, he continues to object to the motion on the basis that a prior, proposed 
Amended Judgment erroneously referred to "Amended" Complaints. DefendantsIRespondents 
sent new proposed Amended Judgments to Taylor deleting that word on February 19,20 10 and 
again copied Taylor on the letter to the Court with the encloscd new, proposed Amended 
Judgments sent on February 23, 2010. (See Ex. C, Supplemental 'Thomson Aff.) Both dates 
predate the date upon which Taylor's objection was filed. 
7. 'favior hlisrcprcsents to this Court 'That DefencIantslResnonctents Fi~ilcd to 
Address Taylor's Concerns About the Proposed Amended ,Jud?ments Prior 
to Filinfr Elis Onnosition. 
Defendants/Rcspondents began the process of seeking a stipulated Amended Judgment on 
February 1, 2010. (See Ex. A, Supplemental Thomson Aff.) Despite the observation that this 
matter needed to be dealt with quickly, 'Taylor did not respond until February 12, 20 10. At that 
time he asked three questions, ostensibly to seek information that would assist them in 
completing their evaluation. (See Ex. C, S~~pplemental Thomson Aff.) Defendants/ Respondents 
answered each of these questions in the order made, including agreeing to change the wording of 
the Amended Judgments to reflect the concerns. Id. Not satisfied with those answers and 
because of Taylor's concerns about the effect of these Amended Judgments in "other cases 
presently pending" he asked additional "questions". (See Ex. C, Supplemental Thomson Aff.) In 
actuality, these were not questions but rather demands to better his position through the Amended 
Judgment process by undoing the attorney fee award, seeking to narrow the legal effect of the 
Amended Judgments to aid him in other actions and/or claims, and claiming that he would prefer 
to have his appeals remanded back to the district court as premature rather than prejudice himself 
in other actions. Id 
As described above and in the email exchange attached to the Supplemental Affidavit, it 
is clear that in fact Defendants/Respondents responded to the questions and concerns expressed. 
Just because Taylor did not like the responses should not allow him to misrepresent to this court 
that no responses were made. More to the point, Taylor reveals his motivation for ctelaying this 
process - he wants to better himself in not only this action but other pending actions. None of 
&7- &*$> 
e l -  *&,& 
these tllotives are a well founded basis for ret'using to slipillate to the proposed Amended 
Judgments and now to object to their entry. 
111. CONCLUSION 
The proposed Amended Judgments should be entered, as drafted and submitted to this 
Court. Moreover, in order to assure that these Amendcd Judgments are made part of the 
appellate record (and thereby ripen Taylor's appeals), i t  is requested that the entry of these 
Amended Judgments be expedited. 
DATED this 1 day of March, 2010. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
ttorn~ys'for Gary D. dabbitt, D. John 
d Y ,  Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley, 
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
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STA'I'E OF IDAHO ) 
>ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Jeffrey A. 'I'homson, having first been duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says as 
follows: 
1 .  I am a shareholder in the law firm of Elam & Burke, P.A., at all relevant times 
counsel of record for Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and 
Wawley Troxell Ennis & Mawley, LLP and having reviewed the contents of the tile in this matter, 
make this affidavit based on personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of email correspondence 
between Plaintiff's counsel and myself dated February I, 20 10. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of email correspondence 
between Plaintiffs counsel and myself dated February 25,2010. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of email correspondence 
between Plaintiffs counsel and myself dated February 19,2010. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of miscellaneous emails 
between Plaintiffs counsel and myself. 
FURTI-IER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this i day of March, 2010. 
'ORN to b e U p d h i s  / day of March, 2010. 
~ e s i d i n ~  at: Meridian 
My Commission Expires: 0 1' 0/20 12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of March, 201 0, I caused a true and correct I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond U.S. Mail 
Michael S. Bissell - Hand Delivery 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC - Federal Express 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 y- Facsimile Transmission 
Spokane, Washington 9920 1 (509) 455-71 1 1 
SUl'l'ldl:h.tIl,N I'i\l, r\ l :FIDAVI r OF JEFFREY A. I'I IOILISON IN SUI"301<'r 01: I>I~l:li i \ i l l~li\ i  I'S' 
,101N.r ILIO I'lON I'OR A M E N D l i D  JU1>C;ILIEN'I' - 3 
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From: Jeffrey A. Thomson 
To: Bissell', 'Mike 
Date: 2/1/2010 4:01 PM 
Subje& Taylor v. mH/McNichols Appeal 
Amchmentf: 100129113013.PDF; judgment-Amended. pdf 
CC : Janls, John; Janis, John; jdl 
Mr. Bissell 
A new Idaho Supreme Court decision came down last Thursday. John Janis and I believe that it impacts the status of the 
consolidated appeal in this matter. I have attached a copy of the Spokane Stmdvresopinion for your reference. 
The attached case raises the possibility that Taylor's appeal will be deemed premature and dismissed or remanded for lack 
of appellate jurisdiction. I think you would agree that disrnissal of the appeal at this late stage will not benefit any party, 
especially since the jurisdictional problem appears curable. 
Here is our analysis. The Spokanecase requires a separate document setting forth the exact relief granted. I t  can be 
entitled Judgment or Order. I f  one is not filed the appeal is considered premature, even if there is an Opinion and "Order" 
expressly dismissing the complaint, as in this case. When Taylor filed his original Notice of Appeal, it was premature 
because there was no Judgment as contemplated by Spokane. There were Judgments later filed and you appropriately filed 
an amended notice of appeal. According to Spokane, this should have cured the premature nature of the appeal and vest 
appellate jurisdiction. But the potential problem under J. Eismann's analysis is that the judgments are only money 
judgments for fees and costs and do not refer to the ultimate relief of disrnissal. So under the Spokane analysis, while the 
Court may technically have jurisdiction over the attorney fee issues, it could decide, sua sponte per Spokane, that there are 
no separate filings expressly dismissing the action and therefore the rest of the appeal is premature. I realize that this could 
lead to absurd results - like affirming attorney fees because there is a prevailing party but failing to address whether the 
party actually prevailed - but that is the nature of this technical decision. I n  all likelihood the Court would dismiss the entire 
appeal to avoid this result. 
We may be able to cure this problem by filing an amended judgment expressly setting forth the disrnissal of the complaint 
and the denial of the motion to amend the complaint and thereby avoid further delay. We can do this by stipulation, if 
Taylor is willing to do so, or by motion to the district court (which maintains jurisdiction to amend a judgment). 
I have attached a proposed Amended Judgment. Please let me know if the proposed Amended Judgment meets with your 
approval no later than Thursday. Please dso let me know if you are willing to stipulate to its entry. Finally, let me know if 
you will agree to supplement the appellate record with the Amended Judgment once it is entered. I don't think any of us 
relish the thought of having to stand before the Idaho Supreme Court in light of Spokaneand explain how we believe the 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. I also don't think any party wants the appeal dismissed for the sole purpose of 
returning to the district court to get an amended judgment and then begin again the appellate process. Please let me know 
your thoughts by Thursday. Thanks. Jeff 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure 
under applicable law. I f  you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you. 
Phone: (208) 343-5454 
E-Mail to: jat@elarnburke.com 
EXHIBIT A 

Jeffrey A. ']Thornson - "Taylor v. flawley 'Troxcll and Clernents Hrown 
+dW 
From: "Roderick G .  Bond" <rbond@cbkla\ivycrs.com> 
'TO: "'James U. LaRue"' <JDL@elamburke.com>, "'Jeffrey A. Thomson"' 
<JA-T@clamburke.com>, "'John Janis'" <jjj@hepworthlaw.com>, "'John Janis'" 
"' 
<johnjanis@aol.com> 
Date: 2/25/2010 1:28 PM 
Subject: Taylor v. I-fawley Troxell and Clements Brown 
CC: "'Reed 'faylor"' <rjt@lewistondsl.com>, "'Melanie IIayes"' <mhayes@cbklawyers.com>, 
"'Mike Bissell"' <mbissell@cbklawyers.com> 
Counsel: 
It goes without saying that I repeat my previous requests for information and if 
your clients are willing to stipulate to judgments and take action that address the 
concerns raised in Reed Taylor's Response, I do not see why we couldn't agree 
on language and orders that would suit everyone's disclosed needs (of course, I 
am not privy to any other reasons you may have for the proposed "Amended 
Judgments"). 
Roderick C .  Bond 
7 S. Howard Streat, Ste.  416 
Spokane, WA 99201 
P.  509.455.7100 
F .  509.455.7111 
WWW.CBKLAWYERS.COM 
- - 
This email and any attachments may be attorney-client privileged, protected as attorney work product, and/or subject 
to any other applicable privileges. The unauthorized vlewing or dissimination of any cmail or attachment is 
prohib~ted. In any event, by reviewing andlor receiving this cmail and any attachments, you irrevocably consent to be 
bound b y  a claw-back agreement to protect this email and any attached files wherein you agree to not to dissem~nate 
any of t h ~ s  ~nforrn~tlon, to keep all infannation confidential, and to return all ernall and attachments to the above 
sender ~f y o t ~  are not an intended recip~ent. 

Jeffrey A. Thomson - RE: Taylor v. HTEH and C8N 
From: Jeffrey A. Thomson 
To: Bond, Roderick 
Date: 2/19/2010 11:42 AM 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. HTEH and CBM 
CC: Bissell', 'Mike; Janis', 'John 
Aaachments: judgment-Amended-McNichols.pdf; judgment-Amended.pdf 
I spoke with Mr. Janis and he agrees and adopts the following on behalf of his clients. What we are seeking by 
way of stipulation are final appealable judgments in order to ripen your client's appeals. While the Judgments 
currently in place are not appealable, except as to attorney fees, they are Judgments in all other respects, 
including as to attorney fees. I would again encourage your client to avoid unnecessary expense and delay by 
stipulating to the Amended Judgments. I have attached new proposed Amended Judgments that remove the 
reference to an "amended" complaint and add a further reference to IRCP 58(a) to the first paragraph. Please 
let me know your client's willingness to stipulate to entry of the attached Amended Judgments. 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from 
disclosure under applicable law. I f  you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by 
replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you. , 
Phone: (208) 343-5454 
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke.com 
>>> On 2/17/2010 at 12:19 PM, in message c017801cab006$3217e6c0$9647b440$@com~, "Roderick C. 
Bond" <rbond@cbklawyers.com> wrote: I Thanks for the email Jeff. 
We understand your position, although we still have not fully researched the 
issue, particularly with the potential ramifications on pending lawsuits. 
Thanks also for the clarification on the Amended Complaint. I hope that you 
understand our concerns based upon the other cases presently pending and the 
potential ramifications to these cases. Nevertheless, in response, I would 
pose the following questions/discussion points to you, which are based upon 
the assumption that your arguments are correct and with Reed Taylor 
reserving all rights and arguments: 
1. I f  there is no judgment as you assert, then there was no 
prevailing party for purposes of attorney's fees and the resulting motions 
and judgments. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Obviously, your clients have 
asserted that Reed Taylor's payment of the attorneys' fees results in that 
he is barred from receiving his money back if he prevails on issues on 
appeal. I f  we agreed to a stipulated judgment, would you and John's clients 
agree then to return the attorney fee payments so as to make that issue 
moot? Obviously, we do not believe that paying the judgments in light of 
the facts and circumstances moots the issue, but we would want that issue 
resolved and we could file a motion to have the whole issue addressed again 
and demand repayment of the fees and costs paid by Reed Taylor. What is 
your and John's thoughts on this issue? 
EXHIBIT C 
2. What about the date of the Judgment and its potential 
ramification? I t  seems to me that we would need language stating that it 
does not bar claims which accrued after Reed Taylor filed his Complaints in 
that action. What are your and John's thoughts in this regard? 
3, My review of Rule 54(a) is that there would be no pleadings or 
matters referenced in the judgment. Thus, nothing should be listed in the 
Judgment. Also, it would seem to me that the document would only be a 
judgment, not an amended judgment. Then, we would either stipulate on the 
attorney's fees or re-litigate that issue I guess, again, based upon your 
and John's theory. I see why you want the attorneys' fees in your proposed 
Amended Judgment to clean up the premature award of attorneys' fees, as that 
issue is a real problem as well under your theory. However, based upon our 
concerns mentioned above, it would seem to me that we might be able to enter 
into a stipulation that accomplishes everything without prejudicing Reed 
Taylor or your clients. 
4. Based upon the pending Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., appeal, 
we frankly would prefer to have the case sent back than to prejudice our 
client in some way. I would say that theory on your side (including cases 
that your clients are acting as attorneys) has been delay and continues to 
be delay. This makes me and Mike both wonder if there is some other motive 
on your side for wanting to have Judge Brudie sign a new document. Maybe 
you and John could confirm in writing that there is no other motive for 
entering your proposed judgments? 
Based upon the above, we are contemplating filing our own motion as well as 
responding to your and John's client's motion. Do you think that it would 
be possible to enter into a stipulation and appropriate judgment that would 
alleviate everyone's concerns? Let me know. Thanks. 
Roderick C. Bond 
7 S. Howard Street, Ste. 416 




This email and any attachments may be attorney-client privileged, protected 
as attorney work product, and/or subject to any other applicable privileges. 
The unauthorized viewing or dissimination of any email or attachment is 
prohibited. I n  any event, by reviewing and/or receiving this email and any 
attachments, you irrevocably consent to be bound by a claw-back agreement to 
protect this email and any attached files wherein you agree to not to 
disseminate any of this information, to keep all information confidential, 
and to return all email and attachments to the above sender if you are not 
an intended recipient. 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Jeffrey A. Thomson [mailto:JAT@elamburke.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, February 16, 2010 10:55 AM 
To: Roderick Bond 
Cc: 'Mike Bissell'; 'John Janis' 
Subject: Re: Taylor v, HTEH and CBM 
Mr. Bond 
I will attempt to answer your questions so that we can move the appeal 
forward and avoid the potential for a remand based on a premature 
appeal. Mr. Janis may have his own thoughts and, if so, I encourage him 
to respond. 
1. You are correct that it is our position there is no final, 
appealable judgment. However, that doesn't change the fact that there 
was a Judgment entered by the district court on the award of attorney 
fees. This Judgment is not a final, appealable Judgment as to the motion 
to dismiss and the motion to amend complaint per the Court's recent 
rulings. Therefore, and in order to avoid confusion through entry of yet 
another Judgment, we are seeking an Amended Judgment. 
2. Thank you for catching this error. The proposed Amended Judgments 
should indeed refer to the Complaints and not to the Amended Complaints. 
We will provide new proposed judgments to reflect this change. 
3. While I'm not certain that a complete listing of every affidavit, 
motion, brief, etc. needs to be listed to perfect the Judgment, I would 
certainly be willing to do my best to add all of those documents if it 
will help us to come to a stipulated agreement for entry of an Amended 
Judgment and thereby avoid the cost of additional briefing and 
attendance at the hearing. 
Please let me know if these answers help in your analysis and whether 
we can stipulate to entry of the Amended Judgment. 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential 
and privileged information exempt from disclosure under applicable law. 
I f  you have received this message by mistake, please notify us 
immediately by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not 
review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you. 
Phone: (208) 343-5454 
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke.com 
>>> "Roderick C. Ebnd" ~rbond@cbklawyers.com~ 2/12/2010 11: 11 AM >>> 
John and Jeff: 
Mike and I have reviewed your joint motions and we are still 
evaluating 
them. However, there is some information we would like to assist us 
in 
completing our evaluation. 
1. Under your theory, there is no final judgment. Why is your 
proposed 
Judgment entitled "Amended Judgment"? Wouldn't it be just the 
Judgment 
under your theory since there is either a judgment or not a judgment? 
2. Could you please explain to me why your proposed Judgment 
states 
"JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in 
its 
entirety"? Obviously, the First Amended Complaints were never filed 
in 
either case. 
3. Finally, under your theory, shouldn't the Judgment specify what 
affidavits, briefs, etc. were considered for each motion instead of 
blanket 
language stating that all the affidavits, motions, briefs, etc. were 
considered for the Amended Judgment? 
I f  you could provide answers to the above, it would be appreciated and 
helpful to us in evaluating your motion and how to proceed and whether 
we 
can all agree on a judgment or not, assuming your theory is correct. 
Thanks. 
Roderick C. Bond 
CBK Clear.jpg 
7 S. Howard Street, Ste. 416 
Spokane, WA 99201 
P. 509.455.7100 
F. 509.455.7111 
< http://WWW.CBKL4WY ERS.COM> www.CBKLAWYERS.COM 
This email and any attachments may be attorney-client privileged, 
protected 
as attorney work product, and/or subject to any other applicable 
privileges. 
The unauthorized viewing or dissimination of any email or attachment 
is 
prohibited. I n  any event, by reviewing and/or receiving this email and 
any 
attachments, you irrevocably consent to be bound by a claw-back 
agreement to 
protect this email and any attached files wherein you agree to not to 
disseminate any of this information, to keep all information 
confidential, 
and to return all email and attachments to the above sender if you are 
not 
an intended recipient. 
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From: .ejohnjanis@aol.com> 
To: ~JATQelarn burke.com>, <mbissell Qcbklawyers.comr 
Date: 2111201 0 5:03 PM 
Subject: Re: Taylor v. HTEHlMcNichols Appeal 
Hi Mike. John Janis here as well following up with this email from Jeff Thompson. He rightly reports we 
drew the same conclusions after reviewing this Spokane Structures, ,Inc. case. I'd make the same 
proposal Mr. Thompson makes for the McNichols case. If you guys are OK with the proposal I will provide 
substantially similar if not identical document as provided by him. 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
537 West Bannock 
Boise, ldaho 83701 
office phone (208) 343 751 0 
fax # (208) 342 2927 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Jeffrey A. Thomson cJAT@elamburke.com> 
To: 'Mike Bissell' cmbissell Qcbklawyers.com> 
Cc: John Janis <johnjanis@aol.com>; James D. LaRue <JDL@elamburke.com>; John Janis 
<jjj @ hepworthlaw.com> 
Sent: Mon, Feb 1, 2010 4:01 pm 
Subject: Taylor v. HTEHIMcNichols Appeal 
Mr. Bissell 
A new ldaho Supreme Court decision came down last Thursday. John Janis 
nd I believe that it impacts the status of the consolidated appeal in 
his matter. I have attached a copy of the Spokane Structures opinion 
or your reference. 
The attached case raises the possibility that Taylor's appeal will be 
eemed premature and dismissed or remanded for lack of appellate 
urisdiction. I think you would agree that dismissal of the appeal at 
his late stage will not benefit any party, especially since the 
urisdictional problem appears curable. 
Here is our analysis. The Spokane case requires a separate document 
etting forth the exact relief granted. It can be entitled Judgment or 
rder. If one is not filed the appeal is considered premature, even if 
here is an Opinion and "Order" expressly dismissing the complaint, as 
n this case. When Taylor filed his original Notice of Appeal, it was 
remature because there was no Judgment as contemplated by Spokane. 
here were Judgments later filed and you appropriately filed an amended 
otice of appeal. According to Spokane, this should have cured the 
remature nature of the appeal and vest appellate jurisdiction. But the 
otential problem under J. Eismann's analysis is that the judgments are 
nly money judgments for fees and costs and do not refer to the ultimate 
elief of dismissal. So under the Spokane analysis, while the Court may 
ethnically have jurisdiction over the attorney fee issues, it could 
ecide, sua sponte per Spokane, that there are no separate filings 
xpressly dismissing the action and therefore the rest of the appeal is 
,*$> 
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remature. I realize that this could lead to absurd results - like 
ftirming attorney fees because there is a prevailing party but failing 
o address whether the party actually prevailed - but that is the nature 
f this technical decision. In all likelihood the Court would dismiss 
he entire appeal to avoid this result. 
We may be able to cure this problem by filing an amended judgment 
xpressly setting forth the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of 
he motion to amend the complaint and thereby avoid further delay. We 
an do this by stipulation, if Taylor is willing to do so, or by motion 
o the district court (which maintains jurisdiction to amend a 
udgment). 
I have attached a proposed Amended Judgment. Please let me know if the 
roposed Amended Judgment meets with your approval no later than 
hursday. Please also let me know if you are willing to stipulate to its 
ntry. Finally, let me know if you will agree to supplement the 
ppellate record with the Amended Judgment once it is entered. I don't 
hink any of us relish the thought of having to stand before the Idaho 
upreme Court in light of Spokane and explain how we believe the Court 
as jurisdiction to hear the appeal. t also don't think any party wants 
he appeal dismissed for the sole purpose of returning to the district 
ourt to get an amended judgment and then begin again the appellate 
rocess. Please let me know your thoughts by Thursday. Thanks. Jeff 
effrey A. Thomson 
lam & Burke, P.A. 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential 
nd privileged information exempt from disclosure under applicable law. 
f you have received this message by mistake, please notify us 
mmediately by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not 
eview, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you. 
hone: (208) 343-5454 
-Mail to: jat @elam burke.com 
From: "Roderick C. Bond" <rbond@cbklawyers.com> 
To: "'Jeffrey A. Thomson"' .~.JATQelamburke.comz, "'Mike Bissell"' <mbissell@c,.. 
Date: 2/5/2010 11:12 AM 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. HTEHIMcNichols Appeal 
CC: "'John Janis'" cjohnjanisQaol.com>, "'John Janis"' cjjj8hepworthlaw.com~ ... 
Jeff: 
Sorry for the delay getting back to you, but Mike and I have been busy with 
other issues and cases. At this time, we cannot agree to anything as we 
have not had time to fully evaluate the issues or meet with our client. I 
would, note, however, that the language in your proposed complaint would not 
be acceptable to us and the effective date of any order would also be an 
issue, even if your analysis was correct. That being said, feel free to 
file whatever motion you need to file and we will timely respond. By 
telling you this, we, of course, are not agreeing that your motion would be 
appropriate. Thanks and sorry for the delay getting back to you. 
Roderick C. Bond 
7 S. Howard Street, Ste. 416 
Spokane, WA 99201 
P. 509.455.71 00 
F. 509.455.71 11 
WWW.CBKLAWYERS.COM 
This email and any attachments may be attorney-client privileged, protected 
as attorney work product, andlor subject to any other applicable privileges. 
The unauthorized viewing or dissimination of any email or attachment is 
prohibited. In any event, by reviewing and/or receiving this email and any 
attachments, you irrevocably consent to be bound by a claw-back agreement to 
protect this email and any attached files wherein you agree to not to 
disseminate any of this information, to keep all information confidential, 
and to return all email and attachments to the above sender if you are not 
an intended recipient. 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Jeffrey A. Thomson [mailto:JAT@ elam burke.com] 
Sent: Friday, February 05, 2010 9:37 AM 
To: Mike Bissell 
Cc: John Janis; Rod Bond; John Janis 
Subject: RE: Taylor v. HTEHIMcNichols Appeal 
Mr. Bissell 
Attached is another recent case on the issue of final judgments and 
jurisdiction over appeals. Though the Court claims to try and clarify 
matters, this second case is not help terribly helpful. Nevertheless, I 
believe the analysis still holds that unless something is done the Taylor 
appeal will be considered premature. I did not hear from you regarding a 
response to my last e-mail, asking for a response yesterday. 
It is my intent to file a motion seeking an amended judgment in the form 
sent to you with the first e-mail. I would prefer to do this by stipulation, 
-*- &es 
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but will proceed with the motion if I do not hear from you. 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and 
privileged information exempt from disclosure under applicable law. 
If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately 
by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, 
copy, or distribute it. Thank you. 
Phone: (208) 343-5454 
E-Mail to: jat @elamburke.com 
>>> "Mike Bissell" <mbissell@cbklawyers.com> 2/1/2010 5:12 PM >>> 
We evaluating it and will get back to you. 
Michael S. Bissell 
The information contained in this email is protected by the attorney-client 
or attorney work product privilege. If you are not the intended recipient 
of this email please notify me in a reply email and delete this message. 
Thank you. 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Jeffrey A. Thomson [mailto:JAT@elamburke.com] 
Sent: Monday, February 01, 201 0 3:02 PM 
To: 'Mike Bissell' 
Cc: John Janis; James D. LaRue; John Janis 
Subject: Taylor v. HTEHlMcNichols Appeal 
Mr. Bissell 
A new Idaho Supreme Court decision came down last Thursday. John Janis and I 
believe that it impacts the status of the consolidated appeal in this 
matter. I have attached a copy of the Spokane Structures opinion for your 
reference. 
The attached case raises the possibility that Taylor's appeal will be deemed 
premature and dismissed or remanded for lack of appellate jurisdiction. I 
think you would agree that dismissal of the appeal at this late stage will 
not benefit any party, especially since the jurisdictional problem appears 
curable. 
Here is our analysis. The Spokane case requires a separate document setting 
forth the exact relief granted. It can be entitled Judgment or Order. If one 
is not filed the appeal is considered premature, even if there is an Opinion 
and "Order" expressly dismissing the complaint, as in this case. When Taylor 
filed his original Notice of Appeal, it was premature because there was no 
Judgment as contemplated by Spokane. 
There were Judgments later filed and you appropriately filed an amended 
notice of appeal. According to Spokane, this should have cured the premature 
nature of the appeal and vest appellate jurisdiction. But the potential 
problem under J. Eismann's analysis is that the judgments are only money 
judgments for fees and costs and do not refer to the ultimate relief of 
dismissal. So under the Spokane analysis, while the Court may technically 
have jurisdiction over the attorney fee issues, it could decide, sua sponte 
per Spokane, that there are no separate filings expressly dismissing the 
action and therefore the rest of the appeal is premature. I realize that 
this could lead to absurd results - like affirming attorney fees because 
there is a preva~ling party but failing to address whether the party 
actually prevailed - but that is the nature of this technical decision. In 
all likelihood the Court would dismiss the entire appeal to avoid this 
result. 
We may be able to cure this problem by filing an amended judgment expressly 
setting forth the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of the motion to 
amend the complaint and thereby avoid further delay. We can do this by 
stipulation, if Taylor is willing to do so, or by motion to the district 
court (which maintains jurisdiction to amend a judgment). 
I have attached a proposed Amended Judgment. Please let me know if the 
proposed Amended Judgment meets with your approval no later than Thursday. 
Please also let me know if you are willing to stipulate to its entry. 
Finally, let me know if you will agree to supplement the appellate record 
with the Amended Judgment once it is entered. I don't think any of us relish 
the thought of having to stand before the Idaho Supreme Court in light of 
Spokane and explain how we believe the Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal. I also don't think any party wants the appeal dismissed for the sole 
purpose of returning to the district court to get an amended judgment and 
then begin again the appellate process. Please let me know your thoughts by 
Thursday. Thanks. Jeff 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and 
privileged information exempt from disclosure under applicable law. 
If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately 
by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, 
copy, or distribute it. Thank you. 
Phone: (208) 343-5454 
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke.com 
From: Jeffrey A. Thomson 
To: Bissell, Mike 
Date: 2/5/2010 10:37 A N  
Subject: RE: Taylor v. HTEH/NcNichols Appeal 
0203154147.pdf Attachments: - 
CC : Bond, Rod; Janis, John; Janis, John 
Mr. Bissell 
Attached Is another recent case on the issue of final judgments and jurisdiction over appeals. Though the Court clalms to 
try and clarify matters, this second case is not help terribly helpful. Nevertheless, I believe the analysis still holds that unless 
something is done the Taylor appeal will be considered premature. I did not hear from you regarding a response to my last 
e-mail, asking for a response yesterday. I t  Is my intent to file a motion seeking an amended judgment in the form sent to 
you with the first email. I would prefer to do thls by stipulation, but will proceed with the motion if I do not hear from you. 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mall message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure 
under applicable law. I f  you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you. 
Phone: (208) 343-5454 
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke.com 
>>> "Mike Bissell" <mbissellbcbklawvers,com> 2/1/2010 5:12 PM >>> 
We evaluating it and will get back to you. 
Michael S. Bissell 
The information contained in this email is protected by the attorney-client 
or attorney work product privilege. I f  you are not the intended recipient 
of this email please notify me in a reply email and delete this message. 
Thank you. 
-----Original Message---- 
From: Jeffrey A. Thomson - : J A T b e m  
Sent: Monday, February 01, 2010 3:02 PM 
To: 'Mike Bissell' 
Cc: John Janis; James D. LaRue; John Janls 
Subject: Taylor v. HTEH/McNichols Appeal 
Mr. Bissell 
A new Idaho Supreme Court decision came down last Thursday. John Janis 
and I believe that it impacts the status of the consolidated appeal in 
this matter. I have attached a copy of the Spokane Structures opinion 
for your reference. 
The attached case raises the possibility that Taylor's appeal will be 
deemed premature and dismissed or remanded for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction. I think you would agree that dismissal of the appeal at 
this late stage will not benefit any party, especially since the 
jurisdictional problem appears curable. 
Here is our analysis. The Spokane case requires a separate document 
setting forth the exact relief granted. I t  can be entitled Judgment or 
Order. I f  one 15 not filed the appeal is considered premature, even if 
there is an Opinion and "Orderw expressly dismisslng the complaint, as 
in this case. When Taylor filed his original Notice of Appeal, i t  was 
premature because there was no Judgment as contemplated by Spokane. 
There were Judgments later filed and you appropriately filed an amended 
notice of appeal. According to Spokane, thls should have cured the 
premature nature of the appeal and vest appellate jurisdktion. But the 
potential problem under J. Eismann's analysis is that the judgments are 
only money judgments for fees and costs and do not refer to the ultlmate 
rellef of dismissal. So under the Spokane analysis, whlk the Court may 
technically have jurisdiction over the attorney fee Issues, it could 
decide, sua sponte per Spokane, that there are no separate Rlings 
expressly dismisslng the action and therefore the rest of the appeal is 
premature. I reallze that this could lead to absurd results - like 
affirming attorney fees -use there is a prwalling party but failing 
to address whether the party actually prevailed - but that Is the nature 
of this technical decision. I n  all Ilkellhood the Court would dlsmiss 
the entire appeal to avoid this result. 
We may be able to cure thls problem by Rling an amended judgment 
expressly setting forth the dlsmlssal of the complalnt and the denial of 
the motlon to amend the complalnt and thereby avoid further delay. We 
can do thls by stipulation, tf Taylor Is willlng ta do so, or by motion 
to the district court (which maintains jurisdktion to amend a 
judgment). 
I have attached a proposed Amended Judgment. Please k t  me know if the 
proposed Amended Judgment meets with your approval no later than 
Thursday. Please also let me know if you are willing ta stipulate ta its 
entry. Finally, let me know if you will agree to supplement the 
appellate record with the Amended Judgment once it Is entered. I don't 
think any of us rellsh the thought of havlng to stand before the Idaho 
Supreme Court in light of Spokane and explaln how we believe the Court 
has jurisdtctlon to hear the appeal. I also don't thlnk any party wants 
the appeal dkmlssed for the sole purpose of retumlng ta the district 
court to get an amended judgment and then begin again the appellate 
process. Pkase let me know your thoughts by Thursday. Thanks. Jeff 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
ConRdentiality Notke: This e-mail message may contaln confldential 
and privileged information exempt from dixlosure under applicable law. 
I f  you have recehred this message by mlstake, please notify us 
immedlately by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not 
review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you. 
Phone: (208) 343-5454 
E-Mail to: 
, [ (2/5/2010)Jeffrey A. ~homson - RE: f - ~ Page 
affirming aflorney fees because there is a prevailing party but failing 
to address whether the party actually prevailed - but that is the nature 
of this technical decision. In all likelihood the Court would dismiss 
the entire appeal to avoid this result. 
immediately by replying to this 
review, disclose, copy, or distr 
Phone: (208) 343-5454 
E-Mail to: jat@elamburke 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ORDER 
v. 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket Nos. 361 30-2009 
) (3613 1-2009) 
MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual; ) Nez Perce County Docket Nos. 2008-1763 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MC NICHOLS, ) (2008-1 765) 
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE ) 
DOES 1 -V, unknown individuals, ) 
1 
Defendants-Respondents. 1 
A S E T H  MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with attachments was filed by 
I l l  
Respondents on March 26, 2010. Further, a MOTION TO AUGMENT AUTHORITY AND I l l  
1 6 1  
ARGUMENT BY ACCEPTING THE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF and a THIRD 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD were filed by Appellant Reed Taylor on April 1, 2010. A 
JOINT RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S THIRD MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD and 
RESPONDENTS' JOINT RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT /I/ 
AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT were filed by Respondents April 2, 2010. Therefore, good I// 
below, file stamped copies of whch accompanied the Motions: //I 
cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the appeal record shall include the documents listed i I 
! I  
l 
I 
2. Judgment in Case No. CV08-01763 as filed in District Court March 18,2010. Ill 
1. Partial Opposition to Taylor's Request for Judicial Notice Re: Defendants' Joint 
Motion for Amended Judgment in No. CV08-01763 and CV08-01765 as filed in 
District Court March 17, 201 0. 
3. Judgment in Case No. CV08-01765 as filed in District Court March 18,2010. //I 
I 
I  
4. Amended Judgment in Case No. CV08-01763 as filed in District Court March 22, 111 
2010. - 
5. Amended Judgment in Case No. CV08-01765 as filed in District Court March 22, 
6. Reed Taylor's Response to Defendants' Joint Motion for Amended Judgments as 
filed in Case Nos. CV2008-1763 and CV2008-1765 (attached as Exhibits A and B). 
0RDF.R  - T 2 n c , k p , t 1 ? 1 - 3 0 0  
ill 
I 
7. Third Amended Notice of Appeal as filed in Case No. CV08-01763 (attached as 
I 
I j 8. Tbrrd Amended Notice of Appeal as filed in Case No. CV08-01765 attached as 
j Exhibit D). 
f 
t 
I t 1  
IT FURTHER IS ORDEFED that the MOTION TO AUGMENT AUTHORITY 
I 
'i AND m C ; m E N T  BY ACCEPTING TEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF filed by 
I 
# f  
f ~uments can Mpellant Reed Taylor April 1,201 0 be, and hereby is, DENIED as any additional ar, 
I I 
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Plaintiff-Appellant, Reed J, Taylor, by and though his attorneys, Michael S. Bissell and 
Roderick C. Band of Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, submits this Response to Defendants' 
Joint Motion for h e a d e d  Judgment: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite requests from the undersigned counsel, the defendants' counsel will not explain 
why "Amended Judgments" are required in the form and manner submitted, except to "ripen" the 
appeal. Of course, when clear questions are not answered by the defendants' counsel, it becomes 
obvious why Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to their proposed "Amended Judgments." 
Curiously, the defendants argue on one hand that there are no final judgments. Yet, on the other 
hand, the defendants submitted proposed "Amended Judgments" for the court to sign and 
included other substantial language that is not in accord with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
11. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
A. The "Amended Judgments" are not required as the court's orders were 
appealable orders. 
An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted and denying a motion to amend are an appealable orders. See Goodman 
Oil Company v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 2010 WL 366704 *3-4 (Idaho 2010); 
I.R.C.P. 54(a); I.R.C.P. %(a); I.A.R. 1 I(a)(l). 
On December 23, 2008, the court entered its opinion and orders granting the defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss and denying Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. Although Reed Taylor 
contends that the court did not address a number of his arguments and claims, the opinions and 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 2 
orders were appealable orders, and Reed Taylor timely appealed those orders. 
2. Even if the defendants are correct, no judgments may be amended after 14 
days from entry. 
A motion to alter or m e n d  a judgment must be brought within 14 days of the date of any 
judgment. I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
Defendants content ,that there are no final judgments and curiously submit, without 
explanation, proposed "Amended Judgments." If, as the defendants contend, a formal judgment 
is necessary and that a judgment was never entered, then there would be no "Amended 
Judgments" as there were never any judgments to begin with. As for incIudiag the attorneys' 
fees and costs judgments within their "Proposed Amended Judgments," the time has long passed 
to amend those judgments, assuming they are not void under the defendants' arguments. 
Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, then only a judgment may be entered, not 
an amended judgment and not addressing issues of fees and costs or the satisfaction of any 
judgments, particularly when those judgments would be void under the defendants' rationale. 
2. Even if the defendants are correct, the judgments must be a separate 
document. 
"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document."I.R.C.P. 58(a). "A 
judgment shaIl not contain a recitaI of pleadings. . ." I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
Thus, it would be wholly inappropriate to include any language regarding the pleadings, 
affidavits or other information considered, particularly when certain pleadings and affidavits 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOJNT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 3 
referenced in the proposed " h e n d e d  Judgments'bere never submined or relied upon the court 
to render its decision on the Motions to Dismiss and Mations to Amend. 
Thus, if the defendanls' argments are correct, any judgment should be a separate 
docment, should not recite pleadings, should confom to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and should not be based upon the language in the proposed Amended Judgments. 
3. Even if the defendants are correct, language should be included in the 
Judgment stating that they do not include cIaims or causes of action which 
accrued after October 15,2008. 
Reed Taylor filed his Motions to Amend and Supplement Complaints on October 15, 
2008. If the court enters any new, revised or amended judgments or orders, then the court should 
insert language in the judgments or orders stating that they do not bar claims or causes of action 
which accrued after October 15,2008. 
4. Even if the defendants are correct and the court enters anew, revised or 
amended judgments, the award of attorneys' fees was premature as there 
was no final judgment under the defendants' theory. 
If the defendants' theory is correct, then the award of any attorneys' fees and costs would 
have been premature as there was no find judgment. 1.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Without a final 
judgment, there can be no prevailing party under Rule 54 and it follows that the judgments 
entered awarding attorneys' fees and costs are void. I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). 
Therefore, Reed Taylor requests that the court order the defendants to pay the $20,058 
previously tendered to them by Reed Taylor to avoid execution into the clerk of the court 
pursuant to I.C. $ 10-1 1 1  5. If so ordered, Reed Taylor would stipulate that a new judgment 
could be entered on the award of attorneys' fees and costs so long as the judgment is worded 
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identical to the prior judgments and is based upon the identical reasons without the necessiq of 
requiring the court to hold new hearings on the issue of fees and costs. If the defendants refuse 
to pay the $20,058 (a total of $40,116) the court clerk, then Reed Taylor requests that the court 
order the defendants to enter judgment in favor of Reed Taylor for the $40,116 owed to him 
5. If the defendants are correct, then a satisfaction of judgment cannot be 
entered by the court and must be a separate document. 
A satisfaction of a judgment may only be entered by a party, the party's attorney or the 
court clerk. I.R.C.P. 58(b); I.G. $ 10-1 115. A judgment must be on a separate document. 
I.R.C.P. %(a). 
Thus, even if the defendants' arguments are correct, a satisfaction of judgment may not 
be entered by the court and should not be included in any judgment or order. Rather, any 
satisfaction of judgment should only be entered by the in accordance with I.C. 5 10-1 115. 
However, if the defendants do not agree to promptly pay the $20,058 to the court clerk, then no 
satisfaction of judgment should be entered by the court clerk and the court should enter a 
judgment in favor of Reed Taylor in the arnount of $20,058 for each action. 
6. If the defendants are correct, the language in the judgments should stated 
that his "Complaints" were dismissed and not his "Amended Complaints" as 
asserted in the proposed Amended Judgments. 
In their proposed "Amended Judgments," the defendants asserted language stating that 
"JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING PlaintifPs Amended Complaint in its entirety." 
See Proposed Amended Judgments, p. 2 (underlined emphasis added). If the defendants' 
arguments are correct, then the judgments or orders entered by the court should only reference 
I 
1 
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"Complaints'bnd not ""Amended Complaints" as Reed Taylor's Amended Complaints were 
never filed." 
7. The defendants fail to address the above issues and fail to submit any 
explanation why their proposed "Amended Judgments" are titled as such 
and contains other questioaable andlor inappropriate language. 
The defendws never answered questions severai issues and questions posed by Reed 
Taylor's counsel in their Joint Motions or otherwise. Why are the defendants proposing 
"Amended Judgments" instead of "Judgments"? Why are the defendants including the 
attorneys' fees judgments in the '"ended Judgments"? Why are the defendants including 
satisfaction of judgments in the "Amended Judgments"? Why have the defendants' worded their 
proposed Amended Judgments in the manner worded in light of the arguments asserted above 
and the Rules of Civil Procedure addressed above? Why did the defendants not limit the 
language in their proposed "Amended Judgments" to only claims and causes of action which had 
accrued through October 23,2008? 
It is not surprising that Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to the proposed 
"Amended Judgments" in Iight of the issues presented above and above unanswered questions. 
DATED this 25th day February, 2010. 
By: I 
RODERICK b. BOND 
MICHAEL ,$ BISSELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
' Counsel for the defendants have acknowledged that "Amended" Complaints should not be included in 
their proposed "Amended Judgments." However, this argument is being asserted to preserve the objection. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 6 
CERTIFICATE OF' SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25Ih day of February, 2010,I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregomg, postage prepaid (if applicable), to the following parties: 
WAND DELIVERY John J. Janis 
U.S. MAIL Hepwort.b, Janis & Brody, Chtd. 
OVERNIGHT MAIL P.O. Box 2582 
FAX TRANSMISSION Boise, ID 83701 -2582 
EIvlAIL (.pdf anachment) 
HAND DELIVERY James D. LaRue 
U.S. MAIL JeErey A. Thomson 
OVEWIGHT MAIL Elam & Burke, PA 
FAX TRANSMISSION P.O. Box 1539 
EMAIL (.pdf attachment) Boise, ID 83704 
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RODERICK C. BONLI, LSB No, 8082 
f\4IGHAEL, S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5962, 
CAMPBEI,L, DISSELL 8;: KIRBY PLLC 
4 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16 
I 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 4-55-71 00 
Fax: (509) 455-7 1 1 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Reed J. Taylor 
IN THE OlSTRTCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIC'I OF TFIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J, TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
MICI-IAEI, E. NcNIGHOLS, an 
individual; CLEMENTS, BROWN & 
McNICNOLS, P.A., an Idaho 
professional corporation; JANE DOES 
I-V, ~~nknown individuals, 
) 
) Nez Perce 6ounty Docket Nos.: 








) REED TAYLOR'S RESPONSE TO 
Defendants-Respondents, ) DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR 
REED J. TAYLOR, 
) AMENDED JUDGMENTS 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
) 
) 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. 
JOEN ASHBY, an individual; ) 
PATRICIC V. COLLINS, am individual; ) 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; ) 
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & ) 
I-IAWLEY, LI,P, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, ) 




Exhibit - B 
m<SI'ONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MO'I'ION FOR AMENDED JIJDCmf;I3JTS - 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Reed J. Taylor, by and though his attorneys, Michael S. Bissell and 
Roderick C. Bond of Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLEC, subnrlits this Response to Defendmts" 
Joint Motion for 'orended Judgment: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite requests from the undersigned counsel, the defendants' counsel will not explain 
why "Amended Judgments" are required in the form and manner submitted, except to "ripen" the 
appeal. Of course, when clear questions are not answered by the defendants' counsel, it becomes 
obvious why Reed Taylor would not agree ta stipulate to their proposed "Amended Judgments." 
Curiously, the defendants argue on one hand that there are no final judgments. Yet, on the other 
hand, the defendants submitted proposed "Amended Judgments" for the court to sign and 
included other substantial language that is not in accord with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
11. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
A. The "Amended Judments" are not required as the court's orders were 
appealable orders. 
An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted and denying a motion to amend are an appealable orders. See Goodman 
Oil Company v. Scotty 's Duro-Bilt Generator, hc . ,  2010 WL 366704 *3-4 (Idaho 2010); 
I.R.C.P. 54(a); I.R.C.P. 58(a); I.A.R. 1 l(a)(l). 
On December 23, 2008, the court entered its opinion and orders granting the defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss and denying Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. Although Reed Taylor 
contends that the court did not address a number of his arguments and claims, the opinions and 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 2 
orders were appealable orders, and Reed Taylor timely appealed those orders. 
B, Assuming Defendants"" artl;umeuts are correct, their proposed "Amended 
1. Even if the defendants are correct, no judgments may be amended after 14 
days from entry. 
A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be brought within 14 days of the date of any 
judgment. I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
Defendants content that there are no final judgments and curiously submit, without 
explanation, proposed "'Amended Judgments." If, as the defendants contend, a formal judgment 
is necessary and that a judgment was never entered, then there would be no "Amended 
Judgments" as there were never any judgments to begin with. AS for including the attorneys' 
fees and costs judgments within their "Proposed Amended Judgments," the time has long passed 
to amend those judgments, assuming they are not void under the defendants' arguments. 
Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, then only a judgment may be entered, not 
an amended judgment and not addressing issues of fees and costs or the satisfaction of any 
judgments, particularly when those judgments would be void under the defendants' rationale. 
2. Even if the defendants are correct, the judgments must be a separate 
document. 
"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." I.R.C.P. %(a). "A 
judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings. . ." I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
Thus, it would be wholly inappropriate to include any language regarding the pleadings, 
affidavits or other information considered, particularly when certain pleadings and affidavits 
ESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR AMENDED JUDGMENTS - 3 
referenced in the proposed "Amended Judgments" were never submitted or relied upon the court 
to render its decision on the Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Amend. 
Thus, if the defendants' arguments are correct, any judgment should be a separate 
docment, should not recite pleadings, should conform to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and should not be based upon the language in the proposed Amended Judgments. 
3. Even if the defendants are correct, language should be included in the 
Judgment stating that they do not include claims or causes of action which 
accrued after October 15,2008. 
Reed Taylor filed his Motions to Amend and Supplement Complaints on October 15, 
2008. If the court enters any new, revised or amended judgments or orders, then the court should 
insert language in the judgments or orders stating that they do not bar claims or causes of action 
which accrued after October 15,2008. 
4. Even if the defendants are correct and the court enters new, revised or 
amended judgments, the award of attorneys' fees was premature as there 
was no final judgment under the defendantsf theory. 
If the defendants' theory is correct, then the award of any attorneys' fees and costs would 
have been premature as there was no final judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Without a final 
judgment, there can be no prevailing party under Rule 54 and it follows that the judgments 
entered awarding attorneys' fees and costs are void. I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). 
Therefore, Reed Taylor requests that the court order the defendants to pay the $20,058 
I 
previously tendered to them by Reed Taylor to avoid execution into the clerk of the court 
I 
pursuant to I.C. 9 10-1 115. If so ordered, Reed Taylor would stipulate that a new judgment 
could be entered on the award of attorneys' fees and costs so long as the judgment is worded 
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identical to the prior judgments and is based upon the identical reasons without the necessity of 
requiring the court to hold new hearings on the issue of fees and costs. If the defendants rehse 
to pay the $20,058 (a total of $40,116) the court clerk, then Reed Taylor requests that the court 
order the defendants to enter judment in favor of Reed Taylor for the $40,116 owed to him. 
5. If the defendants are correct, then a satisfaction of judgment cannot be 
entered by the court and must be a separate document. 
A satisfaction of a judgment may only be entered by a party, the party's attorney or the 
court clerk. I.R.C.P. 58(b); I.C. 5 10-1 11 5. A judgment must be on a separate document. 
I.R.C.P. %(a). 
Thus, even if the defendantsbrguments are correct, a satisfaction of judgment may not 
be entered by the court and should not be included in any judgment or order. Rather, any 
satisfaction of judgment should only be entered by the in accordance with I.C. Ej 10-11 15. 
However, if the defendants do not agree to promptly pay the $20,058 to the court clerk, then no 
satisfaction of judgment should be entered by the court clerk and the court should enter a 
judgment in favor of Reed Taylor in the amount of $20,058 for each action. 
6. If the defendants are correct, the language in the judgments should stated 
that his "Complaints" were dismissed and not his "Amended Complaints" as 
asserted in the proposed Amended Judgments. 
In their proposed "Amended Judgments," the defendants asserted language stating that 
"JUDGMENT is hereby entered DISMISSING Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in its entirety." 
See Proposed Amended Judgments, p. 2 (underlined emphasis added). If the defendants' 
arguments are correct, then the judgments or orders entered by the court should only reference 
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"Complaints" and not "'Amended Complaints" as Reed Taylor's Amended Complaints were 
never filed." 
7. The defendants fail to address the above issues and fail to submit any 
explanation why their proposed "Amended Judpents" are titled as such 
and contains other questionable andlor inappropriate language. 
The defendants never answered questions several issues and questions posed by Reed 
Taylor's counsel in their Joint Motions or otherwise. Why are the defendants proposing 
"Amended Judgments" instead of "Judgments"? Why are the defendants including the 
attorneys' fees judgments in the "Amended Judgments"? Why are the defendants including 
satisfaction of judgments in the "Amended Judgments"? Why have the defendants' worded their 
proposed Amended Judgments in the manner worded in light of the arguments asserted above 
and the Rules of Civil Procedure addressed above? Why did the defendants not limit the 
language in their proposed "Amended Judgments" to only claims and causes of action which had 
accrued through October 23,2008? 
It is not surprising that Reed Taylor would not agree to stipulate to the proposed 
"Amended Judgments" in light of the issues presented above and above unanswered questions. 
DATED this 25th day February, 201 0. 
MICHAEL S. BISSELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
' Counsel for the defendants have acknowledged that "Amendedy' Complaints should not be included in 
their proposed "Amended Judgments." However, this argument is being asserted to preserve the objection. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Zth day of Febnrary, 2010,I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid (if applicable), to the following parties: 
HAND DELIVERY John J. Janis 
U.S. MAIL Hepworth, Janis & Brody, Chtd. 
. 0VEWIGF.ET MAIL P.O. Box 2582 
FAX TRANSMISSION Boise, ID 83701 -2582 
EMAIL (.pdf altachment) 
I IAND DELIVERY James D. LaRue 
U.S. MAIL Jeffrey A. Thomson 
OVERNIGHT MAIL E l m  & Burke, PA 7 FAX TRANSMISSION P.O. Box 1539 
 EMAIL AIL (.pdf attachment) Boise, ID 83704 
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entered in the above entitled action an the 23'* day of December, 2008, Opiltion and 
Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs entered in the 
tabol/e ciiii~lcil wctinn Qn Apn1 3, 3009, J~tdgn-tent entered on April 24, 2009 (and 
subsequent Arncnded Judgment), Opir~ion and Order on Defendants' Defei~dants" 
Motion for Award of Artonley Fees and Costs entered an June 1 ,  2009, [sic] [Opinion 
and Order on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideratio11 and Plaintifl's Motion for 
Reconsideratioil entesed on June I ,  20091, Satisfaction of Judglnent entered on 
Se&~~bcr 3 .  20119, Judgincr~t entered on March 18, 2010, Amendcd . Iuct~mcnt  en~ereij i111 - 
March 22,201 0, the I-fonorable Jeff M. Brudie presiding. 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Couit, and t1xe 
Judginents/Orders described in pafagraph I above are appealable Orders under and 
pursuant to Rules 4 and I f (a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminaiy statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends 
to assert in this appeal are as fbllows (several of which are issues of first impression); 
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect 
otlzers: 
a ,  Did plaintiff' state causes of action against attorneys for fraud, 
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, 
and/or tortious interference andlor causes of actions pertaining to 
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the 
conzrnission of' any of any of the fbregoing causes of action. 
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar 
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breacbes of 
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive coilipensation, and tog-tious 
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and 
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the comrnissior~ of 
any of the foregoing causes of action? 
c. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for 
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con~!er.sion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney 
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the 
attolney knew or sl-tould have kflown were funds in whicl-r the 
plainiiff'held a valid and perfected security interest? 
d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the 
revenues and all of the stock of the coporation, have standing to 
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for claims owned by 
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue 
desivatlve causes of action on behalf of' the corporation? 
e Does a creditor of' an insolvent corporation, who is also a secured 
creditor of the revenues of tlie coiyoration, have standing to assert 
direct causes of action against parties for claims owled by the 
colporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue 
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the co~poration" 
f. Are allegations that an attorney has exceeded hisiher scope of 
representation siifficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege? 
g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients wit11 diverging interests 
when the representation was approved by persons with 
director/officer conflicts of interest? 
h. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bar a person f X o n  asserting 
direct and derivative claims against an attorney, when the plaintiff 
does not have privity of contract with the attorney, for violations of 
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act? 
i .  In considering a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6j, is it 
permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an 
entirely different case in toto and/or to consider documents which 
are not in the record for that case? 
j. Can a stock pledgee of a11 of the stock and revenues of a pledged 
corporation assert direct andlor derivative causes of actions for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
k. Can a secttred creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of 
an insolvent corporation, assert direct and/or derivative claims for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
1. Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related 
actions, consider privileged documents in granting a motion to 
disnliss under IRCP lZ(bj(6) without requiring production of the 
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doculi~ents to the other party? 
n ~ ,  If a party provides privileged documents to an expest and the 
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the 
privileged documents h r  the experts testimouy, has the attorney- 
client privilege been waived and must the documents be produced 
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel? 
n. If Idaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defensc for an attorney, can 
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to I.K.G.P. 
12(b)(b) for actions talcen by the attorney which the attorney 
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of 
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from 
the cotporation client, when the attorney knows or should have 
know11 that: (1) the representatives of the corporation have 
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation 
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the co~poration has not held an 
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of at least two 
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of 
representatioi~ was not in the best iilterests of cach of the attorney's 
three different clients. 
o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary dut~es, special 
duties, and/or third-party beileficiary obligations when the attorney 
knows or sho~~ld  have known (including, without limitation): (1) 
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the 
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the 
non-client and another client is in default of the obligations which 
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the non- 
client has voted the shares appointing hirt~self as the sole officer 
and director of the corporation client, and the corporation client is 
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties 
and not safeguading assets; (3) the assets and funds are 
insufficient to pay the secured creditor urho voted the shares of the 
corporation pledged to him as collateral; (4) that inillions of dollars 
in assets and funds have been unlawfully transfened &om the 
corporation client by the very individuals directing the litigation; 
and (5) the parent corporation of the pledged corporation is also 
being represented by the altoiney and the same non-client is owed 
millions of dollars by the parent corporation client who is highly 
insolvent? 
p. Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the 
United States Constitution or the State of Idaho's Constitution) to 
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes 
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of action to protect and/or recover assets which are subject to a 
security interest and/or pursue causes of actions action attorneys 
relating to any one or more the hregoing? 
q.  Did the district court err in awarding attorneys' fees and costs to 
Defendants pursuant to I.C. fj 12-121, I.C. S; 30-1-746 and I.C. 5 
48-603(5), when plaintiffs claims under each of the foregoing 
statutes involved navel claims andor  issues of first impression, 
and plaintiff asserted claims relating to security interests held by 
him for property received by Defendants? 
r. Can a district court award a defendant attorneys' fees pursuant to 
I.C. l j  30-1-746 when it found that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
bring derivatiire actions as a stock pledgee and secured creditor of 
an insolvent colporation under I.C. $ 30-1-746, which does not 
expressly prohibit a stock pledgee or secured creditor of an 
insolvent corporation from pmsui~lg derivative claims? 
s. Can a district court award attanleys' fees to a defendant pursuant 
to I.C. 5 12- 121 after plaintiffs complaint was dismissed pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6) based in part upon the district court adopting the 
"Litigation Privilege" as a first impressian defense? 
t. Can a district court find that a plaintiff pursued an action 
frivolously when the plaintiff is a secured creditor who pursues 
claims against attorneys who have received pap ten t  for services 
fsom fi~nds subject to valid and perfected security interests and/or 
the proceeds of such valid and perfected security intcrests? 
1 Can a district court make findings of facts that attorney defendants 
did not violate any rules of professional conduct in an action 
dismissed pwsuant to Rule 12(b)(6) wlzen the facts alleged in 
plaintiffs complaint state that the attorneys violated rules of 
professional conduct? 
v. Does the payment of an attorneys' fees and costs iudament that 
was paid d~irins the pendency of an appeal render the issue of 
whether the attorneys' fees were improperly granted moot when 
%judgment debtor paid the itldaments out of fear of execution? 
w Since it  was determined after the entry of an order i~rantina a 
request for attorileys' fees and the correspondinrr iudgment that 
there was no final judgment entered, did the district court err bv 
not c'acntin~ the order a ~ i d  iuilciment re: nttop1e1.s' fecs 3 1 1 1 ~ ~  lherc 
was no prevailing party in an action at the time the order and 
judfiment were entered? 
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4. 'There has not been an Order sealing all or any pofiion of this record. 
5. A reporter's tra~lscript is not reqtrested. 
6. Appellant requests the following documents be incl~kdeci in the clerk's 
record, in addition to those automatieaiiy included imder Rule 28,I.A.R.: 
a. T h i s  Second Amel~ded Notice of Appeal; 
b. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal: 
c. Plaintiffs Amended Notice of Appeal; 
d. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; 
e. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; 
f. Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss; 
g. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Supplemeilt Complaint (including 
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint); 
h. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to 
Anzend Complaint; 
i. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint; 
j. Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and costs; 
k. Defendants' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs; 
I .  Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of 
Fees and Costs; 
m. PIaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request 
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs; 
11. Affridavit of Michael S. Bissell in S~lpport of Plaintif'f Reed J. 
Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Attorney's 
Fees and Costs; 
o. Defendants' Motion to Amend Request for Awad of Attorney's 
Fees; 
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p, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of  I\/fotion to Arnend 
Request f a .  Award of Altomey's Fees; 
q PlaintifPs Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs h4otian to 
Disallow Fees and Costs. 
r. Defendants' Joinder in Brief Filed by Haurlep 7'roxelJ Defenctants 
in Response to Reed Taylor's Motion to Disallow Request for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs; 
s. Opinion and Order on Defetndmts' Motion for Award of Attorney 
Fees and Costs; 
t. Judgment; 
u. plaint if?^ Motion for Reconsideration of the Opinion, Order and 
Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees to Defendants (including the 
corrected version filed on May 29, 2009, at the request of the 
Court); 
v. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Opinion and Order Awarding Attorney's 
Fees to Defendants; 
w. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration; 
x. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney 
Fees and Costs [sic] Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration and Plaintif'fs Motion for Reconsideration; and 
y. Amended Judgment (if' any, as the Court indicated that an 
Amended Jtidgment would be filed). 
7. 1 certify that: 
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a repos-tes 
because a transcript has not been requested. 
b. The clerk of the district coilrt has not been paid any fee for 
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested. 
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid. 
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid 
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e. Service has been made upon a11 parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, 
DATED this 25" day of March, 201 0. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL 62 KIRBY PLLC 
Michael S. Bissell 
AMorneys for Appellant Reed J. Taylor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25'h day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of Appellant's Third Amended Notice of Appeal to the following: 
-- -- HAND DELIVERY John J. Janis 
)( U.S.MAIL Hepworth, Janis & Brody, Chtd. 
--- OVEEWIGHT MAIL P.O. Box 2582 
FAX TMNSMISSION Boise, ID 83701 -2582 2- EMAIL (.pdf aitachent) 
- T 
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j t o ~ ~ i i ~ < ~ t ~ i <  rmiL1, 1 : 3 3  NO. RO$-? 
MlC71-liLliI, S, IlISSEI I,, ISB No 5 762 
C't'tMP13EIdJd. RIS.;SEYI , c%: #tt;,BL' PI.1 C' 
7 Sr~titJ3 Lioivifl'cf E~TcI:~, Sulk 414 
M~~okan-le, MIA "1201 
1 el. (5trO') 455-7 100 
Fax: (509) 455-71 1 i 
I hond:~i jcbE. l~~vyt- r~l lq~ 
-I_- -71_L-I - 
g ~ % d i & g b  h Id tvyer5 - ~ i r ~ !  
IN '1 FIE I> I S T'RIC1' L'CIURT OF 'TI IF SECOND JI JDlC'IAI IIIS I'RICT C tE? '3'frll: 
S rA7-r-i t tF  ILdAllCI, 17.1 AND FOR THE C_'OUN'I'Y OI: Nk.L PERCP 
ftEF13 I TA YLOK, an indiv~clulrl, who is 
I>ringirig tlxs action 011 belralf of hinlself ancl 
otl behalf of the creditors and/or S ~ R T G I I O  Idess 
of i\JA Services Carpoiation and AIA 
Inst~rarzct, Inc ; 
(;AT", Y. BRBEII'I'?', an individual; I). JOIIN 
ASIIBV, a t  individurtl: PATRICK V.  
COLL-INS, alr inctividutxl, KICEIARD A 
RILEY, an nitfivid~tal; IIAWLkY TROXELL 
ENNIS & IIAWLI'Y L.I,P, at1 1clahc.r limited 
1 tabilrt y pat ti.tc-I ship, J rWE I)OL2S I-X, 
iltlk~lotvn ~nctivtclualu: 
Case No.: CICr-08-0 1'765 
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t '  7'1-11: A!SOVE lilAhiLED ItESI)OWDENTS, GARY Lr, f3ABBI'T i ,  f >  JOFIN 
ASIIBY. I-'A*~RIC:K v. COL,I,INS, RICJIAEIL) A. r;tlr,rs.i. nNrJ 
HA w LEY 'I+I:ISX~-:LL, EFJNIS I IAWI~E'I' LI-P ANT) rj XI: t3Artertks* 
A'I'I CI~X~IL'I '  JAMES 11. L,ARIJE, EI.Alt1 & E31JliI-:L;, I' A . t' 0. BOX 
1.4 ic), 13C)ISC:, 11) 8370-l; AN1) 
I '1 Ill:  Cf,ISI;P,K OF 'TI IF ABOVE-EN 1'12 LED C'011I:l'. 
~I't-ilf-iD :lhZf:WI)l*T) N O  I'IC:E 01. APt3T~hI .  - t 
Exhibit - D 
NOTICE IS HEWBY GIVEN THAT: 
1 .  The abo~re named Appellant Reed J. Taylor appeals against the above- 
named Respoildents to tlte Idaho Supreme Court from the final Ordrr granting 
Defendants%otion lo Dismiss and denying Plaintias Motion to Amend Complaint 
entered in the above entitled action on the ~ 3 ' ~  day of December, 2008, Opinion and 
Order on Defendar~ts' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs entered in the 
above entitled action on April 3, 2009, Judgment entered on April 23, 2009, &Opinion 
and Order on Deferrdallts' R4otion for Reconsideration and PlailltifPs Motion for 
Reconsideration entered on June l ,  2009, Satisfaction of Judarnent entered on August 26, 
20 1 0, d~tctp~netit entcrccl o n  ? / f a ~ l ~ X :  30 1 (1, Amended Judpr~~cilt e~rtcred on. March 22. 
20 1 0, the Hotlorable Jeff M. Rrudie presiding. 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgrnents/Orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and 
pursuant to Rtiles 4 and 1 1 (a)( 1 ), I.A.R. 
3. A prelirnillary statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends 
to assert in this appeal are as follows (several of wltich are issues of first impression); 
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect 
others: 
a.  Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fiaud, 
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, 
and/or tortious interference and/or causes of actions pertaining to 
aiding and abetting and/or co~lspiracy to assist others in the 
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of action. 
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar 
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of' 
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, and tortious 
interference andlor causes of action pertaining to aiding ar~d 
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abetting andlor conspiracy to amst  others in the conlnlission of 
any of the foregoing causes of aetiol~? 
c. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for 
canvcrsion atzd other causes of action by alleging that the atforney 
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from hnds  the 
attorney knew or should have known twre funds in which the 
plaintiff held a valid and perfected security interest? 
d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secrired creditor of the 
revenues and all of the stoclc of the corporation, have standing to 
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for clailns owned by 
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue 
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation? 
e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corparation, who is also a secured 
creditor of the revenues of the corporation, have standing to assert 
direct causes of action against parties for claims owned by the 
colporation'? Daes the same plaintiff have standing to pursue 
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the colporation? 
f. Are allegations that an attolney has exceeded hisher scope of 
representation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege? 
g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients ctrith diverging interests 
when the representation was approved by persons with 
directorlofficer conflicts of interest? 
h. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bw a person from asserting 
direct and derivative claiins against an attolney, when the plaintiff 
does not have pieivity of contract with the attorney, for violations of 
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act? 
i. In considering a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is it 
pern~issible for the district court to take judicial notice of an 
entirely different case in tolo andlor to colisider documents which 
are not in the record for that case? 
j. Call a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged 
corporation assert direct andor derivative causes of actions for 
n-talpl.actice against an attorney? 
k. Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of 
an insolvent corporation, assert disect andlor derivative claims for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
I. Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related 
actions, consider privileged documents in gl.anting a motion to 
dismiss under ERCP 12(b)(6) without requiring prodt~t:tion of the 
docunlenrs to the other party? 
t ~ t  If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the 
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the 
privileged documents for the experts testirnony, has the attorney- 
client privilege been waived artd must the doc~lments be produced 
to the apposing party upon a motion to compel? 
n. If Idaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defense for an attorney, can 
the defense be asserted to dismiss an ncrion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney 
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of 
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from 
the corporation client, when the aeorney knows or should have 
known that: (1) the representatives of the corporation have 
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation 
client have collflicts of interest; (3) the corporation has not held an 
annual shareholder meetii~g in years; (4) the purported scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of at least two 
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of each of tile attorney's 
three different clients. 
o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary duties, special 
duties, a~.~d/or third-party beneficiary obligations when the attorney 
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): ( I )  
that ail of the shares and revenues of the coryoratiolr client the 
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the 
non-client and another client is in default of the obligations which 
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the non- 
client has voted the shares appointing himself as the sole officer 
and director of the corporation client, and tile corporation cliellt is 
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties 
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and fi~nds are 
insufficient to pay the secured creditor who voted the sEtares of the 
c;orporation pledged to him as collateral; (4) that ~nilIions of dollars 
in assets and funds have been unlaai l ly  transferred from the 
corporation client by the very individuals directing the litigation; 
and (5) the parent cotporation of the pledged corporation is also 
being represented by the attonley and the same non-client is owed 
nlillions of dollars by the parent corporation client who is highly 
insolvent? 
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p. Does a pla~ntiff have a constitutio~~af right (whether tinder the 
United States Corlstitution or the State of Jdaho's Conr;litiition) to 
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action andlor prusue causes 
of action to protect and/or recover assets which are subject to cl 
security interest and/or pursue causes of actlons action against 
attorneys relating to any one or more the foregoing? 
q. Did the district court err in awarding attorneys' I'ees to Defe~ldants, 
pursuant to I.C. 5 12-121, I.C. fj 30-1-746 and I.C. $ 48-608(5), 
when plaintiffs claims under each of the foregoing statutes 
involved novel claims and/or issues of first impression, and 
plaintiff asserted claims relating to security interests held by him 
for property received by Defendants? 
r. Can a district court award a defendant attorneys' fees pursuant to 
I.C. 5 30- 1-746 when it fou~td that the plaintif-i' was not entitled to 
bring derivative actions as a stock pledgee and secured creditor of' 
an insolvelrt corporation under T.C. tj 30-1-746, virl~ich does not 
expressly prohibit a stock pledgee or secured creditor of an 
insolvent corporation from pursuing derivative clai~ns? 
s. Can a district court award attorneys' fees to a defendant pursuant 
to I.C. 5 1 2- 1 2 1 after plaintiffs complaint was dismissed pursuant 
to Rule 12@)(6) based in part upon the district court adopting the 
"Litigation Privilege" as a first impression defense? 
r .  Can a district court find that a plaintiff pursued an action 
frivolously when the plaintiff is a secured creditor who pursues 
claims against attorneys who have received payment for services 
from funds subject to valid and perfected security interests and/or 
the proceeds of such valid and perfected security interests? 
1.1. Can a district co~lrt make findings of facts that attorney defendants 
did not violate any rules of professional conduct in an action 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in 
plaintiffs complaint state that the attorneys violated rules of 
professional collduct? 
v. -of an attorneys' fees and costs iud~ment that 
was paid during the pendency of an appeal render the issue of 
whether the attorneys' fees were improperly nranted nloot when 
tht. jud~mcnt tlebios the j~lci~rnc~~ts  o t~ t  ol' lkar of esecution? 
/// 
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w Since i t  was determined after the entry of an order granting a 
rhere was no iinal iudrrn~crlt entered, did district cutirt err hy 
lmt vncnting tttc order and i~idgment rc; attnrncvs' kes siltce Ihcre 
was no prevailing party in an action at the t i m ~ t h e  o r d e ~ a ~ d  
judgment were entered? 
4. There has not been an Order sealing all or any portioil ofthis record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is not requested. 
6. Appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's 
record, in addition to those arltomaticalIy included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
a. This Second Amended-Notice of Appeal; 
b. Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal; 
c. Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Appeal; 
d, DefendantsWotion to Dismiss: 
e. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; 
f. Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss; 
g. Plaintiff's Motiorl to Amend and Supplement Complaint (including 
the attached proposed First Amended CompIaint); 
11. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend Complaint; 
i .  Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dislniss and 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint; 
j. Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees: 
k. Defendants' Brief in Support of Costs and Attol~ney's Fees; 
1. Affidavit of James LaRue in Support of Memorandum Costs and 
Attorneys' Fees; 
m. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request 
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs; 
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11. Affidavit of h4ichael S. Bissell in Suppoi-t of Iqaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor's h/lotioti to Disallow Defendants' Request for Attorney's 
Fees an3 Costs; 
o. Defendar-rts' Notion for Leave to Amend Defendants' 
Memorarldrr~n of Costs and Attorneys' Fees; 
p. Defendants' Brief in Support of h4otion for Leave to Amend 
DefendantsWemorandum of Costs and Attol.neys' Fees; 
q.  Plaintifrs Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs h/lotiozl to 
Disallow Fees and Costs; 
r. Del'el~dantsXemorandum in Response to Reed Taylor's Motion 
to Disallow Request far Attorney's Fees and Costs; 
s. PlaintifPs Response to Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend 
Mernorandrun of Costs and Fees; 
t. Plaintiff's Reply to DefendantsResponse to Plaintiffs Motion to 
Disallow Fees and Costs; 
t t .  Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees; 
v. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney 
Fees and Costs; 
w. Judgment; 
x. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Opinion, Order and 
Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees to Defendants; 
y. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Opinion and Order Awarding Attorney's 
Fees to Defendants; 
z. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration; and 
aa. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration 
and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. 
7. 1 certify that: 
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a reporter 
because a tratlscript has not been requested. 
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b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for 
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested. 
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid, 
d. Tile appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. Setvice has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DPITED this 25Ih day of March, 2010. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLI,C 
Roderick C. Bond 
h4ichaeI S. Bissell 
Attorneys for Appellant Reed J. Taylor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25"' day of March, 201 0, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of Appellant's Third Amended Notice of Appeal to the following: 
HAND DELIVERY Jeffrey A. Thornsoll --x.- U.S. MAIL James D. LaRue 
OVERNIGHT MAIL Elam & Burke, PA 
FAX TRANSMISSION P.O. Box 1539 
2% - EMAIL (.pdf attachment) Boise, ID 83704 
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IR 17, i:S:iLB 
2 1 CLAM AND OURKE 
Jhtlres U. LaR~te IS13 P 1 780 
Jci ' f r~y A .  Thnmsvn IS13 833 80 1 
ELAM & BURKE, P.iZ 
2.5 1 E.  I:rorit Street, Suite 3011 
I'.O. Box i 539 
Bo~sc, ldnho 83701 
Telepllone: (208) 343-2454 
F a c s ~ ~ n i l r :  (208) 384-5846 
IN TI IE DISTRIC1 COURT OF TI IE SECOND JLiDleIAL OlSTRlCT Of: 'I'HE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN  AND FOR THE COUN'I'Y OF NEZ PERCE 
Reed J .  Taylor, an individual; 
Pla~nr~ff'AppcllanL, 
V .  
I\llOl IAEL C. hlcNIGHOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P A ,  ari 
ldnho professionel corporation; ,!A NE DOES I -V, 
ilhknown i n d i ~ ~ d u a l s ,  
REED J .  TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Case No. CV 08-01 763 
PARTIAL OPPOSl'fION TO TAYLOR'S 
REQTJCST FOR JUDICIAL NO'I'1CE RE: 
DEFENDAN'I'S' JOINT R/IOTION FOR 
AMENDI'D JUDGMENTS 
Case No, CV 08-0 1765 
GARY D. I3Al'%i3l'i"i', nn individi~itl; D. JOHN 
AS1 IDY, nI1 individual: PATRICK V .  COLLINS, an 
i~liiividual; RICHAI<I) A. RILEY, H I \  individual; 
IIAWI.EY 'TKOXELL ENNlS & IiAWI,EY LLI'. 
tin Idaho litnircd linbilily ~)artnersl~ip; J A N E  DOES 
[-X, u~tknow~b individuals; 
I. INTRODUCTION 
'I'he Hawicy 'l'roxcli Det'cndants do not ohjecr to this Courl taking judicial notice of the 
two memoranda from thc Ada County lawsuit c~~t i t led  Tuyiclr. v. Riley, Hui14i.y Truxcll E~tnjs & 
PAK'1'1.4L OPPOSlTlOM 1'0 TAYLOR'S REQUES'T FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE KE: DEFENDANTS' 
JCI1N'I'~~0'1'f01\; FOR AMENDED JUDCbIENTS - I 
I l c r l t  j q ,  LLI f  IZohct.r :tl. Tiirr?hort* irr?~.i Eherle Brr./ir? Grc/ii?,q Tilrnborc. B 2tfirh'la~t.tz~, C'l7/ci, Case 
No. C\'-(SC-0918868 attached as Exhiblts ,+I and B to h1r. Bond's Affidavit. These Dek~idants 
do object, howcicr, to the relief sought - that this Court defer ruling on the pending Joint bfotion 
for Amended Judgments. It'this Court takes jc~dicial notice of Exhibits it and B, this Court can 
take judicial notice that 'Taylor has now filed a second malpractice lawsuit in a different judicial 
district ("'I"ay1or 11") against some of the same parties sued in this malpractice action ("Taylor 1' '~. 
'I'his Court can also take notice that this second malpractice action involves issues that were or 
could have been litigated in the first malpractice action. In other words, this Court can take 
judicial notice that the second malpractice action is an attempt to forum and judge shop, to 
promote disrespect of this Court's decision by seeking to again litigate to potentially inconsistent 
results, and to create confusion and chaos by filing a multiplicity of needless litigation. (See 
Bond Aff. Ex, '4, p. 8 and cases cited therein.) 
If this Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits A and B, it will note that these documents 
do not stand for the propositions claimed by Taylor; that Taylor completely misses the point of 
Hawley Troxell's positions taken in Taylor I and Taylor 11; that these positions are not 
inconsistent; that the request to defer a ruling asks this Court to make extra-judicial decisions 
with affects beyond its jurisdiction; that Taylor seeks to manipulate the Court system; and that 
the foundation of 'faylor's request for judicial notice does not apply at all to Co-Defendants 
Clcnients Broi%n and MichaeI McNichols. Most importantly, even ifjudicial notice is taken of 
E~hib i t s  i\ and R from Taylor 11, they do not establish grounds to defer a ruling on the pending 
.Ioint Motion for Amended Judgments in this action. 
I'i\Ji i'I;\L OIJf'OSI?'ION 7 '0  f t \ Y L O R ' S  REQUEST FOR J U D I C I A L  N O  TlCE RE: D E F E N D A N T S '  
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11. f%NALYSIS 
,A. Re$ Jfrilirrrtrr in Taylor iI vs. Finid Aprtc;~l;tble ,Juti~ments in 'T;\vlor I. 
Snrprisingly, Ta3 lor wants this Court to knotv that, unhappy with this Court's disnzissal 
of  this malpractice action, he has tiled a second malpractice action against some of the same 
parties named in the first lawsuit (Riley and Hawley Troxell) based on the same or similar issues 
thar were or cotlfd have been litigated in this action. The apparent, but not very clear, reason for 
informing this Court that he is attempting to relitigate this first malpractice lawsuit is iln alleged 
inconsistency between the positions taken by Wawley Troxell in the two malpractice actions, 
There are, in fact, no inconsistencies. There are only decisions to be made by different courts 
regarding the legal effect in each case of this Court's Orders and Opinions, Judgments and 
potential Ainended Judgments. 
The issue to be decided in this case (Taylor I) is not whether the Orders and Opinions and 
Judgments entered by this Court are final, but whether they are appealable. Spokane ,rtrtlctures 
and Gooc/mnn Oil have established what is necessary for an appeal. Neither case, however, 
determines the effect of non-appealable Opinions and Orders upon the application of res jtltlicutn 
in another case. Whether an instrument is appealable requires a different analysis from whether 
an instrument is a final judgment for rrsjutlicc~ttr purposes. I t  could well be that an instrument is 
final for recording purposes, execution, attorney fees or tses j~icliccrtcr but is not an instrument 
from which an appeal lies. These are open questions that have been created but not decided by 
the ,Tj?oktrne S~r~t~'tzire.s and Gooclt?lun Oil cases. 
The important point is each respective court nust  decide for itself the legal effect of the 
Opinions and Orders and Judgments or Amended Judgments upon thar particiliar case. For 
instance, i t  is LIP to this Court to determine i~hether  i t  should cure the prematurity of'Trlylor's 
I'c'\f<'rli\L 0PI'OSf.fION 'r0 TAYLOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE RE: DEFEND,\N rS' 
JOIN'r % I 0  I'ION FOR AMENDED JUDGIIIIENTS - 3 
rippeals and, if  so, uhether the proposed Amended Judginents are the proper cure. On the other 
hand, i t  is up to Acfa County District Judge Crerntvood in Taylor I f  to determine whether the 
current Opinions and Orders and Judgments tire suf1iciently final for purposes of res jrrdicolu or 
~vhether /.ex jridicntil requires a final, a~pealable  judgment.' 
In fact, and as Exhibits '4 and B indicate, the appealability of a judgment inay have no 
effect upon its finality for res judiccitu purposes, 
'-/T]he preclusive effects of a lower court judgment cannot be 
suspended simply by taking an appeal that remains undecided." C. 
Wight, A. Miller & E. Cooper, FederuI Practice cmd Procec/tire, fj 
4433 at 305 (198 1). "The bare act of taking an appeal is no more 
effective to defeat preclusion than a failure to appeal. The 
established rule in the federal courts is that a final judgment retains 
all of its res jrrclicntn consequences pending decisions of the appeal 
apart from the virtually non-existent situation in which the 'appeal' 
actually involves a trial de novo. Id., I j  4433 at 308." 
See Ex. A, pp. 1 1 - 12. 
Hawley Troxell has not taken inconsistent positions. I t  may indeed be the law that a 
document that ends the litigation (in this case, the Opinions and Orders) is a final judgment for 
purposes of res j t idcutn but is not an appealable judgment. Taylor has taken the position in this 
case that the Opinions and Orders are still appealable despite Spokane Strzkctures and now is 
doing all he can to avoid ripening his own appeals based on his desire to get a different appeal 
heard before this one. It certainly appears to be the (new) law that even if these documents are 
final they are not appealable. Hawley Troxell has consistently argued in this case that it seeks a 
'Equally important is the fact that i t  t v i l l  be lip to the Idaho Suprenle Court to determine 
nhether the current instruments are tinal, appealable instruments thereby conferring jiirisdiction 
o\,er the appeal or whether they are not, thereby depriving i t  ofjilrisdiction. I t  remains the 
Defendants' position that Amended Judgments will create no harm or prejudice within Taylor I 
and \sill cure the prematurity of Taylor's appeals thereby allowing the appeals to move forward 
011 the merits. This does not, however, create inconsistencies. 
P A R  i'I.\L Of'POSITION r0  TAYLOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIt4L NO'TICE RE: DEFENDijN PS' 
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tiu;il, apoenlnble j ~ ~ d g m m t  which is not inconsistent with arguing in the second malpractice case 
that ~ ~ l ~ t l e  not r~ppealable these Orders and Opinions are tinal for rrs jrrclictrl~l purposes. 
B. The Request for 'Judicial Notice ilnd Tavlar's Opposition to the ,Joint Motion for 
Amended .Juilements Seek to TuTuninulnte the Court Svstem. 
'Taylor's opposition to and rlo~v this request to defer ruling on the Joint Motion for 
Amended Judgments is an attempt to manipulate the court system in three separate jurisdictions. 
First, Taylor has requested that if Amended Judgments are filed in this action they contain 
language that puts him in a better position than this Coiirt's original rulings. The attempt to use 
the efforts to cure jurisdiction over his own appeals to better his position in this case is a 
inanipulatior~ of the court system. 
Second, the request to take judicial notice of Exhibits A and B makes i t  clear that Taylor 
seeks to manipulate the second malpractice action by asking this Court to either issue Amended 
Judgments that somehow have no res jtrcficilta effect or to defer the ruling so that he can argue 
that there is no final judgment for purposes of res  jlidiiicufu in the second malpractice action. This 
is not only a manipillation of the court system but a request to this Court to make its decision 
based on how it may or may not affect matters outside of this case and beyond this Court's 
jurisdiction. 
Third, Taylor seeks to manipulate the court system in order to affect two appeals pending 
before the Idaho Supreme Court. I-fe asks this Court to defer ruling upon the Joint Motion for 
.\mended Judgtnents so that the Supreme Court will determine his appeal in this action is 
preinatulve and dismiss the appeal so that he can push his other '-pending appeal in Tfijdor. v iJIL~l 
S'~.~-r.ices, rt L I I .  to be heard and decided first in the interest o f  all parties." See Bond XfL, 7 6. 
P:\R TI,\L OPPOSI'TION T O  TI\YL.OR'S REQUEST F O R  J U D f C l A L  NOI ' ICE  RE: DEFENl)l\N'TS' 
.J(_)INT XtOTION FOR ; lX1ENDEU J U D G k t E N ' f S  - 5 
'This Court should not allow Taylor's attempts to manipulate the court system. I'his 
Court stiould consider only the affect of its rulings on this lawsuit and rule based on that analysis. 
'The legal effect of that decision can then be applied by each respective court to each respective 
case. 
C. Nothin? About Taylor's Onposition or This Request for ,Judicial Notice Affects the 
CIemcnts Brown Defendants' Rirht to an Snnealable Judgment. 
'The grounds to defer a ruling on the Joint Motion for Amended Judgments do not apply 
to the Clernents Brown Defendants. There is no second malpractice action against them. There 
is no other foruin in which they have taken a position, inconsistent or otherwise, about the effect 
of the Opinions and Orders entered in this case. This Court's ruling on an Amended Judgment 
for the Clements Brown Defendants will have no effect on Taylor's other lawsuits or interests' 
and should therefore not be deferred. 
111. CONCLUSION 
While the Wawley Troxell Defendants have no objection to this Court taking judicial 
notice of Exhibits A and B from Taylor 11, they do object to the relief sought by this request. A 
decision should be made on the pending joint motion and should not be deferred. In fact, the 
'The Ilawiey 'rroxell and Clements Brown cases have been consolidated tbr purposes of 
appeal. Once one accepts that the Clements Brown Defendants are entitled to an Amended 
Judgment, the logical fallacy of Taylor's request to defer a ruling is fillly illustrated. I t  makes 110 
sense to allow Taylor's premature appeal against the Clements Brown Defendants to be cured 
and proceed forward to the substantive issues, yet defer ruling on an ilrnended Judgment in the 
FIawley Troxell case, leading to dismissal of Taylor's appeal against the Hawley Troxell 
Defendants h r  lack of jurisdiction. 
PI\[< r l i \L  OPPO5ITION r0 T / t Y  LOR'S R E Q U E S T  FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE RE:  DEFEND/\N 1-S' 
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liauley rrouell Delcndants continue to urgv the Coilrt to make its decision as rl~iickly as possible 
because oral argument is scheduled on April 9, 20 10.' 
DATED this '? day of March, 20 10 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley, 
and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - 1 7 day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond - U.S. Mail 
Michael S. Bissell - Hand Delivery 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC - Federal Express 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 - X Facsimile Transmission 
Spokane, WA 99201 (509) 455-71 1 1  
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY, CHTD. 
537 West Bannock Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 2582 






'lt should be noted that in response to a qiiestion fiom the Conrt, Bond agreed that an 
expedited decision on the pending joint motion would be beneficial to all panies. Defendants are 
unaivare of any new event or information that noiv has Bond arguing ..tLII ahead. stop". 
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Hepworih, Janis & Brody 
MAR 1- 2 20f8 
Boise, 119 
IN THlE DISTftICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDMJO, IN .UW FOR THE COUNTY OF NEE PERCE 
W E D  J. TAYLOR, an individual, ) 





MICIfiEL E.. McNICKOLS, an individual; ) 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, ) 
P A,, an Idaho professional corporation; 
JANE DOES I-V, unknown individuals; 
Defendants. 
The Court, having entered an Order on December 23,2008 granting Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT that Plaintiff Reed .7. Taylol's 
Amended Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. 
Dated this / & day of March 20 10. 
/'--'I 
CERTIFICAE OF MAILING 
I hereby certiiiji that a true copy of the foregoi~lg OPMON & ORDER was: 
hand delixrered via court basket, or 
9% 
/mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this /B day of 
March 20 10, to: 
Michael S. Bissell 
Roderick C. Bond 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
7 South Howard St, Ste 4 16 
Spoltane, WA 99201 
John J. Janis 
Wepworth, Janis, & Brody, Chtd. 
PO Box 2582 
Taylor vs McNichols, et a1 
Judgment 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JVDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDALIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 1 
Plaintiff, 





GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN ) 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRTCK V. ) 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A 1 
RTLEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL ) 
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited ) 





fie Court, having entered an Order on December 13,  2008 granting Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT that Plaintiff Reed I. Taylor's 
Amended Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. 
Dated this /@ day of March 20 10. - 
1 hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPZNION & ORDER was: 
hand delivered via court basket, or 
9% / mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this day of 
March 20 10, to: 
Michael S. Bissell 
Roderick C. Bond 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
7 South Howard St, Ste 416 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Taylor vs. Babbitt, et al 
I~~cfgtnent 

Hepworth, Janis & Br0dY 
MAR 2 4 201W 
Boise, It2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THX JVDICIAL DISTRTCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TED3 COWTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 1 
) CASE NO. CV08-01763 
Plaintiff, ) 
) M N D E D  SUI)GMENT 
V 1 
) 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual; ) 
CLEMENTS, B R O W  & McNICWOLS, ) 
P A , an Idaho professional corporation; 1 
JANE DOES I-V, unknown individuals; 1 
1 
Defendants. ) 
The Court, having entered an Order on December 23, 2008 granting Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY THE .JUDGMENT OF THEi COURT that Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's 
Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety 
Dated this Zi?.-- day of March 2010 
/"7 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing O P M O N  & ORDER was: 
hand delivered via court basket, or 
4 
& d mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this day of 
March 2010, to: 
Michael S. Bissell 
Roderick C. Bond 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
7 South Howard St, Ste 4 1 6 
Spokane, WA 9920 1 
John J. .Tanis 
Hepworth, Janis, & Brody, Ghtd. 
PO Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701 
Taylor vs. McNichols, et al 
Amended Judgment 

THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH STRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
) CASE NO. CV08-0 1765 
) 
) AMENDED WDGMENT 
) 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN ) 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL ) 
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; ) 
Defendants. 
The Court, having entered an Order on December 23,2008 granting Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT that Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's 
Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. 
Dated this 2 2 day of March 20 10. 
CERTIFIGAE OF Mt?tILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of'the foregoing OPMION & ORDER was: 
hand delivered via court basket, or 
f' L 
/mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this - d2 day of 
March 20 1 0, to: 
Michael S. Bissell 
Roderick C. Bond 
Campbell, Bisseil & Kirby, PLLC 
7 South Howard St, Ste 416 
Spokane, WA 9920 1 
James D. LaRue 
Elam & Burke PA 
PO Box 1539 
Taylor vs. McNichols, et al. 
Arnended Judgment 
